L'Insostenibile Leggerezza del Credito - banshee
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By: banshee on Mercoledì 05 Novembre 2003 23:54
E no! Basta!
L’aneddotica personale per supportare l’idea della superiorita’ del sistema America e’ proprio uno strazio!
Abbia pieta’! Ci risparmi!
Del resto, non c’entra un Sommo Bene!
Come se io pretendessi di disquisire del modo di essere americano prendendo ad esempio Michael Jackson.
Abbiamo gia’ sopportato le lodi dei prodi della V armata, che passeggiavano, ehm volevo dire avanzavano, nel deserto iracheno, mentre nello stesso momento i coetanei europei avevano l’unico problema di trovare parcheggio di sabato sera.
Mia cognata a quel tempo si trovava proprio negli States per conseguire un Master, e mi ha assicurato che c’erano sue compagne di studi che nello stesso momento avevano delle vere e proprie crisi isteriche perche’ si erano spezzate un’unghia.
Molto piu’ prodi, a mio parere, erano i coetanei francesi degli anni ’50, che resistettero fino allo stremo in Indocina alle truppe di Ho Chi Mihn, accerchiati, in drammatica inferiorita’ numerica, facendosi massacrare fin quasi all’ultimo uomo, mentre gli Yankees si rifiutavano, disperatamente richiesti, di portar loro soccorso, dando copertura aerea contro i Rossi.
Concentriamoci sul debito aziendale, piuttosto, il focus, come giustamente dice lei.
Solo, suggerirei di lasciar perdere gli spreads. La riduzione degli spreads e’ solo un effetto, mentre l’attenzione deve essere portata alla causa.
E la base sta nel flusso di nuovo credito che si e’ dovuto immettere nel sistema per ottenere quegli effetti.
Qualche cifra?
Dunque, nel primo semestre di quest’anno il Credito Totale si e’ dovuto espandere di 2,82 trilioni di dollari, annualizzato, insomma nuovo credito immesso pari al 25% del PIL (truccato). Mica male, eh?
Passiamo alle aziende?
Bene, sempre nel primo semestre, la crescita annualizzata del Credito Non Finanziario e’ stata pari ad 1,88 trilioni di dollari, contro una media 1990-1998 di 629,1 miliardi, e superiore del 40% alla crescita di 1,37 trilioni registrata lo scorso anno, gia’ vista come stupefacente record. Avete presente una crescita parabolica? Beh, questo dato riassume il concetto!
Passiamo ai consumatori?
Allora, sempre nel primo semestre, i Crediti Ipotecari sono cresciuti di 850 miliardi di dollari, contro una media 1990-1998 di 196,7 miliardi.
Tutto questo per ottenere una crescita della Spesa Interna Lorda di poco superiore al 5% (in current dollars). Ed io devo star qui a sopportare i lazzi contro l’atrofizzata Europa in confronto alla dinamica America, a registrare ciancie di un inflazione americana bassa e sotto controllo, a subire appelli alla prudenza verso l’oro, qualificato come troppo speculativo.
Questo magnifico sistema americano ha avuto bisogno di essere inflazionato SOLO NEGLI ULTIMI 22 TRIMESTRI con nuovo Credito Totale pari a 11,7 trilioni di dollari, una crescita del 57%, per tirare avanti, ed io devo sentirmi dire che L’ORO E’ TROPPO SPECULATIVO!
L’unica moneta (sissignori, MONETA) la cui inflazione massima puo’ raggiungere al massimo l’uno per cento annuo, e solo a prezzo di enormi costi materiali ed umani, e’ troppo speculativa. E l’inflazione del sistema dollaro, cresciuta del 57% in meno di 9 anni, e’ bassa e sotto controllo. E……Cicciolina e’ vergine!
Tra l’altro, la fantasiosita’ del sistema finanziario d’oltreoceano non smette mai di stupire.
Ultimamente riescono addirittura ad inflazionare riducendo contemporaneamente l’M3.
Avrete notato che negli ultimi 3 mesi questa grandezza monetaria e’ diminuita di 37 miliardi di dollari, circa l’1,9% in meno, mentre nel precedente trimestre era aumentata di 220 miliardi (+ 11%).
Beh, sembra che la liquidita’ sia in contrazione, direte voi.
A me invece sembra che sia entrata in azione una nuova Fed occulta: la premiata ditta “Fannie & Freddie”!
Le GSE hanno aumentato in maniera esponenziale le loro attivita’, soprattutto comprando aggressivamente crediti ipotecari ed ABS, fornendo un mare di liquidita’ alle banche, agli hedge funds, ed all’intera comunita’ finanziaria.
Ma per finanziare questa straordinaria espansione del loro bilancio, esse hanno emesso Agency Bonds a lungo termine, che quasi tutto il mondo ha trovato molto appetitosi, tranne gli sclerotici alla BCE. E questi strumenti non entrano a far parte dell’M3.
Et voila’! Un’incredibile iniezione di liquidita’ senza risultanze negli aggregati monetari.
Per dirla con Noland “an out of control Bubble of dollar financial claim creation”.
Grazie tante che gli spreads si sono ridotti ai minimi termini.
Vi ricordate la spike improvvisa dei tassi di interesse americani in luglio?
Beh, basto’ quella per spargere il terrore in parecchi ambienti; il 1 agosto fu registrata una giornata drammatica. Ma Fannie & Freddie furono lesti a portare soccorso: i Compratori dell’Ultima Speranza aumentano i loro Mortgage Portfolios di 160 miliardi nel trimestre luglio-settembre (+ 13 miliardi nel trimestre precedente), ed il problema e’ risolto.
Tutti son contenti, creditori e debitori, e Zibordi puo’ entusiasmarsi ed esibirsi in un superbo non-sense monetario (vedi post “Crollo della moneta……”). Sospetto che il nostro stia tentando con tutte le sue forze di ottenere un incarico governativo come consulente economico. Gli manca ancora quella pericolosita’ sociale (sul tipo Bernanke, per intenderci) necessaria per aspirare ad un posto come banchiere centrale, ma il ragazzo e’ volitivo e si impegna.
Ora, tutti assumono il loro debito come garantito dal Governo Federale; in realta’, l’unico debito da quest’ultimo esplicitamente garantito e’ quello di Ginnie Mae, che stranamente non e’ entrata a far parte della Premiata Ditta, chissa’ perche’. Ma assumiamolo pure come implicitamente garantito, e ragioniamo di conseguenza: il loro debito deve essere considerato a tutti gli effetti come Debito Federale, ed a questo VA AGGIUNTO!
Una specie di Quinto Deficit, che viene dopo il Quarto (costituito dalle obbligazioni della Social Security, che sono fuori bilancio), e prima del Sesto (in formazione, nella forma chiamata Medicare, costo stimato di 400 miliardi in 10 anni, che vi prometto triplicare quando si calcolera’ quello effettivo).
Eppure si strombazza che l’inflazione americana e’ bassa e sotto controllo, che l’oro e’ troppo speculativo, e si esibisce con orgoglio una Spesa Interna Lorda aumentata meno di 1/5 rispetto al Nuovo Credito di cui ha avuto bisogno. Una Spesa Interna Lorda per Consumi, bisognerebbe specificare: sono probabilmente riusciti a portare questa grandezza ad un livello superiore al 90% del PIL. Complimenti!
“Ma si’” – riconoscera’ a questo punto Zibordi – “ ho gia’ convenuto che questa questione del debito comportera’ dei problemi ad un certo punto”.
Il fatto e’ che questa questione del debito americano comportera’, e temo prima di quanto si pensi, non DEI problemi, o QUALCHE problema; essa comportera’ IL problema!
LA QUINTESSENZA SUBLIMATA DEL CONCETTO STESSO DI PROBLEMA!!!
In un post datato marzo 2002 sul forum, parlavo di stagflazione come risultanza piu’ probabile della piega che stavano prendendo le cose in America, e tuttora lo penso; e sara’ accompagnata da una deflazione senza precedenti di assets finanziari ed immobiliari, soprattutto in America.
Ma riguardo alle forme ed alle modalita’ ed alle conseguenze della resa dei conti, beh, queste non so neppure immaginarle. Abbiamo un precedente nella stagflazione degli anni ’70, ma credo sia piuttosto flebile come termine di paragone. Oggi la magnitudo delle grandezze monetarie e finanziarie implicate (si pensi anche solo alle posizioni derivate) e’ forse centinaia di volte superiore a quella dell’epoca.
Ma di una cosa sono sicuro: tra non molto, ci vorranno 1,6 usd per comprare 1 euro, e la cosa non finira’ li’, a meno che negli States non si cambi registro.
E questo non a causa delle brillanti performance o prospettive economiche europee, o perche’ da queste parti siano refrattari all’inflazionare la propria moneta (anche se bisogna riconoscere che quantomeno salvaguardano una certa decenza in materia), ma per un motivo “quantitativo” che ho gia’ avuto modo di proporre. Oggi il 68% delle riserve mondiali e’ denominato in dollari, contro il 13% denominato in euro. Quel 68% diminuira’ man mano che il pianeta si rendera’ conto dell’insostenibilita’ di esporre la propria ricchezza ad un annichilimento da inflazione, e diminuira’ di parecchio. Per come la vedo io, i transfughi potranno essere accolti solo dall’euro (torno a far notare come l’inizio del declino del biglietto verde sia coinciso quasi perfettamente con la nascita “fisica” della moneta europea), in attesa che la valuta cinese diventi una vera valuta.
Altre valute che “fondamentalmente” magari si trovano anche in una posizione migliore rispetto all’euro, come il dollaro canadese e, soprattutto, quello australiano (ma insisterei nel tenere d’occhio il rand, che mi sta facendo pentire di averlo anzitempo abbandonato), difettano di questa qualita’ quantitativa.
E poi, bisognera’ pur riconoscere che tra i banchieri centrali, gli unici a cui e’ rimasto un po’ di sale in zucca sono quelli europei (sperando che Trichet non ci smentisca clamorosamente).
Questo e’ Issing:
It was just a few weeks after 11 September 2001, when the German British Forum met in London. On that occasion, I had already the privilege to participate in a panel on ‘a new framework for the US-European partnership.’ In my introduction, I stated that ‘... such traumatic events – hitting us as individuals, as nations and as a community of nations – have led us to rediscover a sense of purpose, reaffirm common values and act in solidarity. This brings people closer together in times of trial.’ Unfortunately, this sense of closer-than-ever ties across the Atlantic has not lasted long. Two years and two wars later, the relationship has proved rockier than expected…
…I would like to briefly elaborate on the issue of global imbalances, which have attracted so much attention. While the notion of global imbalances may have different meanings to different people, the interpretation which will underlie my talk this evening concerns the international flow of goods, services and capital. Such imbalances manifest themselves in large trade and current account deficits in some countries, with corresponding surpluses in others. When one talks about global imbalances in this sense, one, of course, is immediately drawn to the persistent US current account deficit, which has existed more or less continually since the early 1980s and which currently runs at roughly 5% of GDP. As a consequence, the net liabilities of the US vis-à-vis the rest of the world increased to around 23% of GDP by end-2002 – compared with less than 5% in the early 1990s…
There are three main reasons why a large current account deficit that goes beyond such medium-term equilibrium considerations may be a cause for concern… First, persistent current account deficits – and, in particular, trade deficits – may give rise to protectionist pressures in the deficit country. If the country is a major trading nation, this may pose a serious threat to the global trading system. Second, there is the risk of a disorderly adjustment. And third, world savings may not be allocated efficiently…
Regarding the risk of a disorderly adjustment, it should be emphasised that any excessive current account deficit will need to adjust eventually. What cannot last, will not last. The crucial issue is whether the adjustment will be orderly or involve a large and disruptive change in key economic variables. Such a disorderly adjustment would affect not only the rest of the world but, in particular, the deficit country itself, turning this issue into a truly global one. There are a number of factors, which may increase the risk of a disorderly adjustment. For example, the longer the flow imbalances exist and the larger they – and the associated stock imbalances – are, the larger the required adjustment back to more reasonable levels would be. The risk of a disorderly adjustment is likely to increase with the magnitude of the needed adjustment. A further factor that may play a role in determining the orderliness of the adjustment process is the composition of the capital flows which finance the current account deficit. In particular, ‘hot’ portfolio flows may quickly reverse direction in a highly integrated global financial system characterised by close substitutability of different markets with respect to the diversification benefits they offer…
At a minimum…it should be ensured that capital flows occur in an environment, in which timely and accurate information about investment projects is available, so that capital can flow to uses with the highest (risk-adjusted) rates of return. The importance of this condition is highlighted by the accounting irregularities at US companies, which resulted in an overstatement of actual profitability…
Another reason why the efficiency of the allocation of global savings may be an issue is that, more recently, the external deficit of the United States reflects actions by public entities rather than private sector interactions. On the one hand, the US saving-investment gap is at present largely a public one, reflecting the increase in fiscal deficits. On the other hand, the financing of the current account deficit has shifted from private funds to public funds, as many central banks – in particular in Asia – are engaged in large purchases of US government securities. Given the historical track record of public entities with respect to the efficient use of funds, this shift towards the public sector – both on the financing and on the allocation side – may in itself provide some cause for concern.
The current level of the US current account deficit is in the longer run unsustainable and an adjustment will eventually occur, whether actively supported by macroeconomic policies or not. The question is only whether it will happen in an orderly fashion. By supporting an adjustment sooner rather than later policy-makers could, in principle, help to ensure such a gradual and orderly adjustment, while at the same time possibly contributing to a more efficient use of global savings and safeguarding the global trading system by limiting protectionist pressures. This would be in the interest of all countries involved, including the United States.
I sometimes have the impression that Europe and the United States are separated by two different schools of thought in that respect. In Europe the view seems to prevail that a problem with the US current account deficit indeed exists, while on the other side of the Atlantic many people do not consider this to be a problem, at least not for the US, but rather for Europe. Consequently, Europe should find a solution to it. Paraphrasing a statement, which former US Treasury Secretary Connolly made with respect to the US currency, one could summarise this view as ‘It may be our deficit, but it is your problem.’ It is, however, important to acknowledge that this is an issue of global relevance, as the smooth adjustment of a situation that is unsustainable is in the interest of countries on both sides of the Atlantic and also the rest of the world. Indeed, it appears that, despite the occasional rhetoric to the contrary, policy-makers in the US are well aware of the potential negative consequences of a disorderly adjustment on the US economy.
But how can an adjustment be achieved? A slowdown in the deficit country’s growth rates relative to the rest of the world typically plays an important role in any such adjustment. This could, for example, mean an actual growth slowdown in the United States, thereby reducing the demand for imported goods and services, or a growth acceleration in the rest of the world, which increases the demand for US exports. If we had to decide on one or the other, the choice would not be difficult – it is higher growth everywhere else. This preference is also reflected in frequently heard demands from the other side of the Atlantic that Europe should generate faster growth to aid the adjustment process. In this respect it is extremely important to specify how this higher growth is to be achieved. Artificially stimulating the economy by large budget deficits and/or inflationary monetary policy is no viable option. In fact, history tells us that such policies can only provide temporary straw fires, with potentially damaging long-term consequences. To illustrate this point let me briefly take you back in time to the mid-1980s. At that time, the US-dollar had been appreciating rapidly over a number of years and the US current account stood at around 3% of GDP – at that point a post-war historical peak. Concerned about the potential side effects and risks involved in such an unsustainable situation, policy-makers from the main industrialised countries decided to tackle this problem in a coordinated fashion. In addition to agreeing to bring down the external value of the US dollar, they also decided that Europe and Japan should pursue policies aimed at stimulating domestic demand. They would thus become the ‘locomotives’, which would bring about the adjustment, while at the same time raising global growth. In the so-called Louvre Accord in 1987 the governments and central banks of the major industrialised countries, for example, agreed that Japan would ‘follow monetary and fiscal policies which will help to expand domestic demand and thereby contribute to reducing the external surplus.’ We all know what happened subsequently. The expansionary policies in Japan and, in particular, the monetary easing that was involved contributed to an asset market bubble, which burst and led to a decade of very sluggish growth and created structural imbalances which are still constraining growth in Japan to some extent today. Seen from this perspective, some of the problems of today's world economy date back to misguided policies triggered by efforts to solve global imbalances.
Instead of short-term activism, which is likely to create imbalances in other areas and does not solve the underlying problem, sustainable policies are needed, with a view towards the medium and long-term…
The ECB’s forward-looking policy with the objective of ensuring medium-term price stability together with necessary structural reforms is thus an indispensable condition for raising the potential growth rate of the euro area economies. In that context, one of the main reasons why such a policy is effective in providing a growth-enhancing environment is that it anchors and stabilises people’s expectations about future price developments. Therefore it is crucial to carefully guide those expectations, rather than try to manipulate them to obtain short-term benefits, while endangering the longer-run credibility of the overall monetary policy strategy…
In that context, let me briefly address an argument that is sometimes made to justify the demand for a more aggressive expansionary policy in Europe. According to this argument, the United States have contributed to strong global growth in the second half of the 1990s, thereby ‘saving’ the rest of the world, and in particular Europe, from stagnation and recession. This implies, according to the proponents of this argument, that it would now be Europe’s turn to do likewise and to provide the needed growth impetus. This argument is not new and was used already extensively in the mid-1980s when the world economy, as I said earlier, found itself in a similar situation as today. But the argument is as wrong and dangerous today as it was then. The United States has not conducted macroeconomic policies with a view towards the world, thereby sacrificing domestic policy objectives in favour of global considerations. Both then and now, for good reasons the focus has been on the United States and the resulting policies happened to provide the rest of the world with some benefits – at least in the short run. This stance was succinctly summarised by Federal Reserve Chairman Greenspan in a 1999 Senate hearing: ‘We would never put ourselves in a position where we envisaged actions we would take to be of assistance to the rest of the world but to the detriment of the United States.’ As a consequence, the argument – which is sometimes elevated to the standard of a ‘moral obligation’ – that European policy-makers should forego important domestic policy goals is untenable. This is especially true if such goals were to be sacrificed in favour of short-term stimulus measures, which would not solve any of the underlying real problems, which give rise to the existing imbalances…
Although faster growth in the rest of world may support the adjustment process, part of this adjustment will eventually have to come from an adjustment of the saving-investment gap in the United States… A considerably larger correction will be necessary for the public saving-investment balance, with the current fiscal stance certainly not being sustainable in the long run. Such a correction will in all likelihood imply lower growth for some time. The choice is, however, not between correction or no correction, but between a correction sooner rather than later. The current situation is not sustainable and an adjustment is inevitable. A timely one may in the end be less costly than a postponed but eventually more disruptive one…
Regarding the current global imbalances, the euro area will play its part in trying to ensure that the adjustment will be as orderly as possible. However, it would be dangerous to believe that excessive expansionary measures would be a valuable contribution. They would be in the interest neither of the US nor of the euro area, as they would give rise to imbalances elsewhere which would have to be corrected at some point in the future as well. Even now, there is certainly no lack of liquidity in the world.
Stability – also on the global level – begins at home and a narrow focus on the external side is certainly too short-sighted. In particular, the notion that higher growth – regardless of how it is achieved – is beneficial for the global economy, is fundamentally flawed. Rather than shifting imbalances between countries and regions, a more sensible approach would be for macro policy-makers to provide the framework within which sustainable growth can be achieved. For monetary policymakers, this means trying to achieve medium-term price stability… The orderly adjustment of existing global imbalances should always be considered as an issue of shared interest. We can only succeed in this respect, if we act as partners, rather than as antagonistic competitors. In the longer run, domestic and global stability, national and international interests, do not conflict, but go hand in hand.”
Riguardo all’oro, la speculazione puo’ certamente essere presente nelle azioni del settore. Questo perche’ l’inusitata inflazione messa in circolo puo’ certamente andare ad infettare anche quella “carta”, come tutto il resto; per cui, anche se metterei la mano sul fuoco che le societa’ minerarie aurifere serie raggiungeranno col tempo valutazioni neppure immaginabili, e’ senz’altro possibile nel frattempo registrare sventramenti da – 50% del capitale impegnato.
Ma parlare del metallo fisico come strumento speculativo a questi livelli di prezzo e’ come bestemmiare in chiesa.
Anche riconoscendo la sua non rilevanza nell’ambito del commercio e delle transazioni mondiali, per il momento almeno, solo a voler aggiustare il suo prezzo per l’inflazione monetaria e pur nell’impossibilita’ di fare calcoli accurati, viene fuori un valore sicuramente superiore al triplo di quello segnato attualmente dallo spot.
