situazione fondamentale dei mercati

Richemont - gz  

  By: GZ on Giovedì 20 Marzo 2003 15:56

Richemont ha annunciato oggi-40% di utile e il titolo perde solo l'8%. Non è un cattivo segno. Il grafico indica che il mercato sono già mesi che se lo aspettava, le notizie arrivano sola alla fine in questo caso Se tra tre giorni il titolo è sempre sopra il doppio minimo, dopo aver incassato la notizia attesa è un buy (hanno Cartier, Van Cleef and Arpels, Piaget, Vacheron Constantin, Officine Panerai, Baume & Mercier, Lancel, Montblanc, Alfred Dunhill ecc...)

 

  By: banshee on Giovedì 20 Marzo 2003 13:32

Secondo il gestore elvetico Reto Stiffler, specialista europeo di Julius Baer, sono da tenere sott'occhio tre titoli in particolare: Schneider Electric, Dsm e Richemont. «La prima ha un indice di indebitamento molto basso», dice Stiffler. Mentre Dsm, leader nella trasformazione di vitamine per gruppi chimici, associa alla economica valutazione di Borsa un alto dividendo. E infine Richemont ha un portafoglio vincente nei beni di lusso. ________________________________________ Scivolone di Richemont alla Borsa di Zurigo (-8% circa alle 11) dopo che numero due mondiale del lusso ha lanciato un pesante warning sui conti del 2002-2003. Oggi il gruppo, in un comunicato emesso dalla sede di Ginevra, ha reso noto che "il risultato operativo del 2002-2003 (a fine marzo) sarà al di sotto delle attese del mercato e potrebbe essere inferiore del 40% a quello del 2001-2002", quando aveva totalizzato 482 milioni di euro, su un fatturato di 3,86 miliardi. Secondo Richemont le vendite dei due principali settori del gruppo, gioielleria e orologeria sono in calo, in quanto i consumatori sono meno inclini agli acquisti nell'attuale clima

la fiducia de tedeschi migliora - moderatore  

  By: Moderatore on Martedì 18 Marzo 2003 12:12

GERMANIA:INDICE ZEW SALE A MARZO A 17,7 PUNTI DA 15 FEBBRAIO PREVISIONI INDICAVANO UN CALO (ANSA) - FRANCOFORTE, 18 MAR - L'indice Zew, che misura la fiducia degli analisti e degli investitori istituzionali tedeschi, ha segnato a marzo un rialzo a 17,7 punti dai 15 punti di febbraio. Lo ha reso noto oggi l'Istituto di ricerche economiche di Mannheim che pubblica mensilmente l'indicatore. Le previsioni erano di un dato in leggero calo a 12,8 punti. L'istituto ha sottolineato di nutrire un ''moderato ottimismo'' per la seconda meta' del 2003, anche se il clima e' appesantito dallo scenario di una guerra in Iraq e dall'andamento dei mercati. Il recente taglio dei tassi da parte della Bce, secondo l'ente di ricerca, ha influito positivamente sulle aspettative. (ANSA) Modificato da - moderatore on 3/18/2003 11:17:50

 

  By: LaSignoraMaria on Lunedì 17 Marzo 2003 15:22

--------------- corriere della sera ------------------- Chi costa meno di quanto vale Valgono in Borsa meno del loro patrimonio netto. Tra i nomi delle blue chips europee con un rapporto prezzo/valore di libro (price/book value) inferiore all’unità (0,40-0,80) brillano colossi del calibro di Volkswagen, Renault, Continental, Valeo. E ancora le principali aziende del settore delle costruzioni, come Lafarge o Pilkington. Il p/bv «stracciato» è un dato comune anche a grandi gruppi bancari e assicurativi, come l’anglo-olandese Ing (0,78) o la francese Agf (0,56). Mentre tra i nomi italiani svetta Bnl, che ha raggiunto un livello di p/bv che sfiora appena lo 0,6. Se il prezzo non copre il valore è davvero arrivato il momento di guardarli? «La risposta non è univoca e si devono valutare le singole storie aziendali - afferma Luca Comi, responsabile della ricerca azionaria di Epta sim -. Quando però la sottocapitalizzazione colpisce gruppi del settore industriale, automobilistico e delle costruzioni con un ritorno sul capitale pari al 10-12%, si deve prestare attenzione». In pratica, se il prezzo conveniente è accompagnato da una redditività a due cifre, potrebbe essere saggio accumulare alcuni titoli, magari approfittando di ulteriori momenti di depressone delle quotazioni. Secondo il gestore elvetico Reto Stiffler, specialista europeo di Julius Baer, sono da tenere sott'occhio tre titoli in particolare: Schneider Electric, Dsm e Richemont. «La prima ha un indice di indebitamento molto basso», dice Stiffler. Mentre Dsm, leader nella trasformazione di vitamine per gruppi chimici, associa alla economica valutazione di Borsa un alto dividendo. E infine Richemont ha un portafoglio vincente nei beni di lusso. Gherardo Spinola, gestore europeo di Azimut, fa invece alcune considerazioni sui titoli assicurativi. «In Europa tutto il comparto è calato moltissimo. Ma nessuno in questo momento sembra volerlo in portafoglio. Eppure le quotazioni attuali ricordano i minimi degli anni Novanta». Tra gli industriali con un p/b molto basso e un buon dividendo Spinola ricorda Volkswagen. E alcuni titoli bancari italiani. «Banca Intesa ha un rapporto p/b pari a 0,9 e il processo di ristrutturazione in corso potrebbe creare nuovo valore», sottolinea. Emilio Franco, responsabile gestione analisi di SanPaoloImi am, vota invece per Unicredit «interessante sia sul fronte del rapporto prezzo/utili che in termini di prezzo/patrimonio netto». Da più parti vengono poi segnalazioni alla volta di Bnl. L’istituto - molto penalizzato nel recente passato dalle battaglie senza esito per un eventuale controllo e dalla crisi argentina - è una scommessa rischiosa. Che potrebbe però pagare a medio lungo termine. Oggi quota con uno sconto pari al 40% del suo valore di libro. E ancora sul versante bancario italiano, secondo alcuni esperti la sottovalutazione rispetto al patrimonio è evidente soprattutto tra le banche popolari. Per Massimo Trabattoni, responsabile azionario Italia di Mps am, ha un buon potenziale la Banca Popolare di Bergamo. Certo anche grandi istituti internazionali molto efficienti, come Bnp Paribas, adesso vengono trattati con un rapporto p/b di poco superiore all'unità. Mentre in stagioni di mercato più sereno questi colossi quotano a valori decisamente più alti. L’altra faccia dello sconto, però, sono le oggettive difficoltà in cui si dibattono molti leader. Sulle banche internazionali, per esempio, pesa il forte calo dell'attività di investment banking e in taluni casi, come per Deutsche Bank, un basso rapporto p/b value è «giustificato da oggettive difficoltà del gruppo», conclude Comi. Marco Sabella Modificato da - giorgia on 3/17/2003 14:23:8

 

  By: banshee on Martedì 04 Marzo 2003 20:21

L'Oracolo non ha detto solo quello. Qui sotto c'è una piccola anticipazione della prossima lettera agli azionisti della Berkshire...... ___________________________________________ Charlie [Munger, Buffett's partner in managing Berkshire Hathaway] and I are of one mind in how we feel about derivatives and the trading activities that go with them: We view them as time bombs, both for the parties that deal in them and the economic system. Having delivered that thought, which I'll get back to, let me retreat to explaining derivatives, though the explanation must be general because the word covers an extraordinarily wide range of financial contracts. Essentially, these instruments call for money to change hands at some future date, with the amount to be determined by one or more reference items, such as interest rates, stock prices, or currency values. If, for example, you are either long or short an S&P 500 futures contract, you are a party to a very simple derivatives transaction--with your gain or loss derived from movements in the index. Derivatives contracts are of varying duration (running sometimes to 20 or more years), and their value is often tied to several variables. Unless derivatives contracts are collateralized or guaranteed, their ultimate value also depends on the creditworthiness of the counterparties to them. In the meantime, though, before a contract is settled, the counterparties record profits and losses--often huge in amount--in their current earnings statements without so much as a penny changing hands. The range of derivatives contracts is limited only by the imagination of man (or sometimes, so it seems, madmen). At Enron, for example, newsprint and broadband derivatives, due to be settled many years in the future, were put on the books. Or say you want to write a contract speculating on the number of twins to be born in Nebraska in 2020. No problem--at a price, you will easily find an obliging counterparty. When we purchased Gen Re, it came with General Re Securities, a derivatives dealer that Charlie and I didn't want, judging it to be dangerous. We failed in our attempts to sell the operation, however, and are now terminating it. But closing down a derivatives business is easier said than done. It will be a great many years before we are totally out of this operation (though we reduce our exposure daily). In fact, the reinsurance and derivatives businesses are similar: Like Hell, both are easy to enter and almost impossible to exit. In either industry, once you write a contract--which may require a large payment decades later--you are usually stuck with it. True, there are methods by which the risk can be laid off with others. But most strategies of that kind leave you with residual liability. Another commonality of reinsurance and derivatives is that both generate reported earnings that are often wildly overstated. That's true because today's earnings are in a significant way based on estimates whose inaccuracy may not be exposed for many years. Errors will usually be honest, reflecting only the human tendency to take an optimistic view of one's commitments. But the parties to derivatives also have enormous incentives to cheat in accounting for them. Those who trade derivatives are usually paid (in whole or part) on "earnings" calculated by mark-to-market accounting. But often there is no real market (think about our contract involving twins) and "mark-to-model" is utilized. This substitution can bring on large-scale mischief. As a general rule, contracts involving multiple reference items and distant settlement dates increase the opportunities for counterparties to use fanciful assumptions. In the twins scenario, for example, the two parties to the contract might well use differing models allowing both to show substantial profits for many years. In extreme cases, mark-to-model degenerates into what I would call mark-to-myth. Of course, both internal and outside auditors review the numbers, but that's no easy job. For example, General Re Securities at year-end (after ten months of winding down its operation) had 14,384 contracts outstanding, involving 672 counterparties around the world. Each contract had a plus or minus value derived from one or more reference items, including some of mind-boggling complexity. Valuing a portfolio like that, expert auditors could easily and honestly have widely varying opinions. The valuation problem is far from academic: In recent years some huge-scale frauds and near-frauds have been facilitated by derivatives trades. In the energy and electric utility sectors, for example, companies used derivatives and trading activities to report great "earnings"--until the roof fell in when they actually tried to convert the derivatives-related receivables on their balance sheets into cash. "Mark-to-market" then turned out to be truly "mark-to-myth." I can assure you that the marking errors in the derivatives business have not been symmetrical. Almost invariably, they have favored either the trader who was eyeing a multimillion-dollar bonus or the CEO who wanted to report impressive "earnings" (or both). The bonuses were paid, and the CEO profited from his options. Only much later did shareholders learn that the reported earnings were a sham. Another problem about derivatives is that they can exacerbate trouble that a corporation has run into for completely unrelated reasons. This pile-on effect occurs because many derivatives contracts require that a company suffering a credit downgrade immediately supply collateral to counterparties. Imagine, then, that a company is downgraded because of general adversity and that its derivatives instantly kick in with their requirement, imposing an unexpected and enormous demand for cash collateral on the company. The need to meet this demand can then throw the company into a liquidity crisis that may, in some cases, trigger still more downgrades. It all becomes a spiral that can lead to a corporate meltdown. Derivatives also create a daisy-chain risk that is akin to the risk run by insurers or reinsurers that lay off much of their business with others. In both cases, huge receivables from many counterparties tend to build up over time. (At Gen Re Securities, we still have $6.5 billion of receivables, though we've been in a liquidation mode for nearly a year.) A participant may see himself as prudent, believing his large credit exposures to be diversified and therefore not dangerous. Under certain circumstances, though, an exogenous event that causes the receivable from Company A to go bad will also affect those from Companies B through Z. History teaches us that a crisis often causes problems to correlate in a manner undreamed of in more tranquil times. In banking, the recognition of a "linkage" problem was one of the reasons for the formation of the Federal Reserve System. Before the Fed was established, the failure of weak banks would sometimes put sudden and unanticipated liquidity demands on previously strong banks, causing them to fail in turn. The Fed now insulates the strong from the troubles of the weak. But there is no central bank assigned to the job of preventing the dominoes toppling in insurance or derivatives. In these industries, firms that are fundamentally solid can become troubled simply because of the travails of other firms further down the chain. When a "chain reaction" threat exists within an industry, it pays to minimize links of any kind. That's how we conduct our reinsurance business, and it's one reason we are exiting derivatives. Many people argue that derivatives reduce systemic problems, in that participants who can't bear certain risks are able to transfer them to stronger hands. These people believe that derivatives act to stabilize the economy, facilitate trade, and eliminate bumps for individual participants. And, on a micro level, what they say is often true. Indeed, at Berkshire, I sometimes engage in large-scale derivatives transactions in order to facilitate certain investment strategies. Charlie and I believe, however, that the macro picture is dangerous and getting more so. Large amounts of risk, particularly credit risk, have become concentrated in the hands of relatively few derivatives dealers, who in addition trade extensively with one another. The troubles of one could quickly infect the others. On top of that, these dealers are owed huge amounts by nondealer counterparties. Some of these counterparties, as I've mentioned, are linked in ways that could cause them to contemporaneously run into a problem because of a single event (such as the implosion of the telecom industry or the precipitous decline in the value of merchant power projects). Linkage, when it suddenly surfaces, can trigger serious systemic problems. Indeed, in 1998, the leveraged and derivatives-heavy activities of a single hedge fund, Long-Term Capital Management, caused the Federal Reserve anxieties so severe that it hastily orchestrated a rescue effort. In later congressional testimony, Fed officials acknowledged that, had they not intervened, the outstanding trades of LTCM--a firm unknown to the general public and employing only a few hundred people--could well have posed a serious threat to the stability of American markets. In other words, the Fed acted because its leaders were fearful of what might have happened to other financial institutions had the LTCM domino toppled. And this affair, though it paralyzed many parts of the fixed-income market for weeks, was far from a worst-case scenario. One of the derivatives instruments that LTCM used was total-return swaps, contracts that facilitate 100% leverage in various markets, including stocks. For example, Party A to a contract, usually a bank, puts up all of the money for the purchase of a stock, while Party B, without putting up any capital, agrees that at a future date it will receive any gain or pay any loss that the bank realizes. Total-return swaps of this type make a joke of margin requirements. Beyond that, other types of derivatives severely curtail the ability of regulators to curb leverage and generally get their arms around the risk profiles of banks, insurers, and other financial institutions. Similarly, even experienced investors and analysts encounter major problems in analyzing the financial condition of firms that are heavily involved with derivatives contracts. When Charlie and I finish reading the long footnotes detailing the derivatives activities of major banks, the only thing we understand is that we don't understand how much risk the institution is running. The derivatives genie is now well out of the bottle, and these instruments will almost certainly multiply in variety and number until some event makes their toxicity clear. Knowledge of how dangerous they are has already permeated the electricity and gas businesses, in which the eruption of major troubles caused the use of derivatives to diminish dramatically. Elsewhere, however, the derivatives business continues to expand unchecked. Central banks and governments have so far found no effective way to control, or even monitor, the risks posed by these contracts. Charlie and I believe Berkshire should be a fortress of financial strength--for the sake of our owners, creditors, policyholders, and employees. We try to be alert to any sort of mega-catastrophe risk, and that posture may make us unduly apprehensive about the burgeoning quantities of long-term derivatives contracts and the massive amount of uncollateralized receivables that are growing alongside. In our view, however, derivatives are financial weapons of mass destruction, carrying dangers that, while now latent, are potentially lethal.

Warren Buffett è ancora piuttosto negativo - gz  

  By: GZ on Lunedì 03 Marzo 2003 21:38

Warren Buffett è ancora piuttosto negativo ------------------------------------------------------ Buffett on Investing in Stocks Today 'Unfortunately, the hangover from [the market bubble] may prove to be proportional to the binge.' FORTUNE Monday, March 3, 2003 By Warren Buffett We continue to do little in equities. Charlie and I are increasingly comfortable with our holdings in Berkshire's major investees because most of them have increased their earnings while their valuations have decreased. But we are not inclined to add to them. Though these enterprises have good prospects, we don't yet believe their shares are undervalued. In our view, the same conclusion fits stocks generally. Despite three years of falling prices, which have significantly improved the attractiveness of common stocks, we still find very few that even mildly interest us. That dismal fact is testimony to the insanity of valuations reached during The Great Bubble. Unfortunately, the hangover may prove to be proportional to the binge. The aversion to equities that Charlie and I exhibit today is far from congenital. We love owning common stocks--if they can be purchased at attractive prices. In my 61 years of investing, 50 or so years have offered that kind of opportunity. There will be years like that again. Unless, however, we see a very high probability of at least 10% pretax returns (which translate to 6% to 7% after corporate tax), we will sit on the sidelines. With short-term money returning less than 1% after-tax, sitting it out is no fun. But occasionally successful investing requires inactivity. WHAT WORRIES WARREN Avoiding a 'Mega-Catastrophe' Derivatives are financial weapons of mass destruction. The dangers are now latent--but they could be lethal. FORTUNE Monday, March 3, 2003 By Warren Buffett Charlie [Munger, Buffett's partner in managing Berkshire Hathaway] and I are of one mind in how we feel about derivatives and the trading activities that go with them: We view them as time bombs, both for the parties that deal in them and the economic system. Having delivered that thought, which I'll get back to, let me retreat to explaining derivatives, though the explanation must be general because the word covers an extraordinarily wide range of financial contracts. Essentially, these instruments call for money to change hands at some future date, with the amount to be determined by one or more reference items, such as interest rates, stock prices, or currency values. If, for example, you are either long or short an S&P 500 futures contract, you are a party to a very simple derivatives transaction--with your gain or loss derived from movements in the index. Derivatives contracts are of varying duration (running sometimes to 20 or more years), and their value is often tied to several variables. Unless derivatives contracts are collateralized or guaranteed, their ultimate value also depends on the creditworthiness of the counterparties to them. In the meantime, though, before a contract is settled, the counterparties record profits and losses--often huge in amount--in their current earnings statements without so much as a penny changing hands. The range of derivatives contracts is limited only by the imagination of man (or sometimes, so it seems, madmen). At Enron, for example, newsprint and broadband derivatives, due to be settled many years in the future, were put on the books. Or say you want to write a contract speculating on the number of twins to be born in Nebraska in 2020. No problem--at a price, you will easily find an obliging counterparty. When we purchased Gen Re, it came with General Re Securities, a derivatives dealer that Charlie and I didn't want, judging it to be dangerous. We failed in our attempts to sell the operation, however, and are now terminating it. But closing down a derivatives business is easier said than done. It will be a great many years before we are totally out of this operation (though we reduce our exposure daily). In fact, the reinsurance and derivatives businesses are similar: Like Hell, both are easy to enter and almost impossible to exit. In either industry, once you write a contract--which may require a large payment decades later--you are usually stuck with it. True, there are methods by which the risk can be laid off with others. But most strategies of that kind leave you with residual liability. Another commonality of reinsurance and derivatives is that both generate reported earnings that are often wildly overstated. That's true because today's earnings are in a significant way based on estimates whose inaccuracy may not be exposed for many years. Errors will usually be honest, reflecting only the human tendency to take an optimistic view of one's commitments. But the parties to derivatives also have enormous incentives to cheat in accounting for them. Those who trade derivatives are usually paid (in whole or part) on "earnings" calculated by mark-to-market accounting. But often there is no real market (think about our contract involving twins) and "mark-to-model" is utilized. This substitution can bring on large-scale mischief. As a general rule, contracts involving multiple reference items and distant settlement dates increase the opportunities for counterparties to use fanciful assumptions. In the twins scenario, for example, the two parties to the contract might well use differing models allowing both to show substantial profits for many years. In extreme cases, mark-to-model degenerates into what I would call mark-to-myth. Of course, both internal and outside auditors review the numbers, but that's no easy job. For example, General Re Securities at year-end (after ten months of winding down its operation) had 14,384 contracts outstanding, involving 672 counterparties around the world. Each contract had a plus or minus value derived from one or more reference items, including some of mind-boggling complexity. Valuing a portfolio like that, expert auditors could easily and honestly have widely varying opinions. The valuation problem is far from academic: In recent years some huge-scale frauds and near-frauds have been facilitated by derivatives trades. In the energy and electric utility sectors, for example, companies used derivatives and trading activities to report great "earnings"--until the roof fell in when they actually tried to convert the derivatives-related receivables on their balance sheets into cash. "Mark-to-market" then turned out to be truly "mark-to-myth." I can assure you that the marking errors in the derivatives business have not been symmetrical. Almost invariably, they have favored either the trader who was eyeing a multimillion-dollar bonus or the CEO who wanted to report impressive "earnings" (or both). The bonuses were paid, and the CEO profited from his options. Only much later did shareholders learn that the reported earnings were a sham Modificato da - gz on 3/3/2003 20:52:19

Dividendi al 4% non servono - gz  

  By: GZ on Venerdì 31 Gennaio 2003 19:31

Qui sotto è stato messo il solito grafico (cortesia di Masfuli) che mostrava che i dividendi sono molto bassi rispetto al livello medio degli ultimi 50 o 80 anni e quindi le borse sono ancora care ecc..... Ma se fosse vero allora il listino inglese che paga il 4% medio di dividendo dovrebbe avere perso poco (e anche quello italiano che paga quasi lo stesso) mentre quello americano che paga l'1.7% dovrebbe avere perso molto di più. Invece succede il contrario esatto. La borsa americana, effettivamente paga solo un 1.7% medio di dividendo ed è la borsa occidentale che ha perso di MENO. Quelle che hanno perso di più sono quelle che pagano il 4%... Curioso no ? Quella inglese, la maggiore in europa e una borsa in cui NON ci sono stati scandali, in media la più onesta in europa e forse nel mondo, ad es paga IN MEDIA ORA IL 4.1% DI DIVIDENDI quando le obbligazioni statali che rendono di più al mondo ti danno il 4% al massimo. Ma con la differenza che i dividendi in 10 anni aumentano, cioè pagano la stessa cifra solo per un anno o due, massimo tre o quattro, ma poi lo aumentano. Mentre i BTP o Bund pagano sempre la stessa cifra. Comunque per non fare sempre la discussione oziosa, qui ci sono i titoli inglesi maggiori che oggi erano positivi con i loro dividendi annui (Div.A. in pence) Modificato da - gz on 2/1/2003 1:25:30

 

  By: massimo on Sabato 25 Gennaio 2003 19:05

grazie dei grafici e soprattutto sono daccordissimo che contano solo gli utili e che i multipli "sembrano" elevati. Quello che importa per i titoli sono gli utili che devono ancora arrivare, per questo ho scritto sembrano tra virgolette, in quanto se fossero alti la sopravvalutazione diventerebbe sottovalutazione, ma proprio per i dubbi che ci sono su questi utili futuri volevo capire in caso di delusione quanta strada al ribasso avremmo, e un primo dato è il book value, che però sappiamo tutti che a acusa degli assetti intangibili non è un indicatore sicuro, allora volevo incrociarlo con la cassa. Avete anche una cassa media per lo sep500 per vedere che differenza c'è tra il suo valore di libro e quello di cassa??? A quel punto ipotizzando che la differenza sia per una parte reale e per una parte intangibile ci avvicineremmo a capire il margine di sicurezza dello sep500, anche se grossolanamente in quanto gli assetti intangibili della coca cola hanno un valore simile alla cassa per il margine di sicurezza, mentre non è così per altre società, ciao massimo

 

  By: xxxxxx on Sabato 25 Gennaio 2003 13:58

Questo è l'ultimo. Anche se non sono aggiornatissimi, ci vede chiaramente che i multipli sono ancora storicamente molto elevati.

 

  By: xxxxxx on Sabato 25 Gennaio 2003 13:56

...

 

  By: xxxxxx on Sabato 25 Gennaio 2003 13:55

...

 

  By: xxxxxx on Sabato 25 Gennaio 2003 13:54

...

 

  By: panarea on Sabato 25 Gennaio 2003 12:42

Analisi fondamentale è un solo e unico rapporto P/e: il resto sono favole. P=il prezzo che il mercato dà, magico incontro di idee e comportamenti di migliaia di operatori (dal superscafato raider al pensionato cassetista al pazzo che vende x comprarsi il motorino). E=quando è l'utile. Se volete Stock option possono andarci dentro come costo, ma l'utile (salvo palesi trucchi) è quello. Il resto DCF, ebit e compagnia, mol,mon,book value, nav,rapporti esoterici sono specchietti. Conta solo il P/e. Il problema delle borse è solo questo: il p/e medio considerandolo anche dal dopoguerra ad oggi, è sempre ALTO.

 

  By: massimo on Sabato 25 Gennaio 2003 10:37

I titoli e quindi il mercato sono valutati esclusivamente per gli utili attesi nei prossimi mesi, quindi come per i titoli la pericolosità del mercato è nel mancare gli obbiettivi e calare, ma in caso di utili zero quello che frena la discesa sono i valori tangibili della società. Se una società guadagna 20 cents per share a p/e 20 varrebbe 4$ e neppure si guarda al valore di libro o alla sua cassa, ma se gli utili diventano zero allora diventa importante guardarci. A questo punto per valutare il mercato azionario è bene fare attenzione alle società dello SeP500 e sembra che tutti si aspettino una crescita degli utili, quindi dovremmo concludere che le azioni quest'anno cresceranno, solo che abbiamo tante variabili che possono rovinare la festa, ma quello che rimane interessante è che tantissimi titoli sono valutati così poco che avremmo poco da perdere e sembra che sia meglio stare dentro in quanto in caso di perdita si scende poco, ma in caso di salita si sale molto, inoltre abbiamo le scorte di magazzino ai minimi storici e questo oltre che a fare da paracadute farebbe volare gli ordini in caso di ripresa, cosa che non è successo l'anno scorso perchè le scorte erano alte e l'aumento del pil non ha generato grossi ordini. Quindi a questo punto abbiamo gli utili attesi dello sep500, ma chiedo a GZ e chiunque altro se esiste un valore medio sia della cassa delle aziende dello sep 500 che del valore di libro e dei debiti, così avremmo un quadro completo di quanto sia il potenziale calo ancora nei prezzi delle azioni usa, ciao massimo