sistema bancario ombra - gz
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By: GZ on Mercoledì 12 Dicembre 2007 13:17
A volte mi dimentico che il 90% della gente che conosco e anche l'80% di che legge questo sito si perde nelle disquisizioni più economiche e tecniche per cui può essere utile rammentare l'essenziale
Senza che nessuno ne parlasse negli ultimi dieci anni si è creato un ^"Sistema Bancario Ombra" ("Shadow Banking", come lo chiama ad es. Bill Gross#http://money.cnn.com/2007/11/27/news/newsmakers/gross_banking.fortune/index.htm?section=money_news_newsmakers^, il maggiore investitore del reddito fisso del mondo). "Ombra" nel senso che :
1) il grosso delle transazioni finanziarie tra banche, fondi, assicurazioni e aziende avviene al di fuori dei mercati tramite derivati (CDO, CDS, Credit Default Swap...), non regolamentati, di cui la persona normale e anche per dire il manager o dirigente di una media azienda o persino banca non ha la più pallida idea
ii) una grossa fetta dei crediti e debiti, mutui, crediti al consumo e auto, prestiti per fusioni, junk bonds... sono piazzati fuori bilancio tramite strutture finanziarie ad hoc ("Conduit, SIV...") di cui la persona normale anche informata non ha la più pallida idea
Secondo uno dei maggiori esperti di derivati e consulente delle maggiori banche, ^Satyajit Das sul Financial Times di 2 giorni fa#http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/31d504c8-a855-11dc-9485-0000779fd2ac.html^, un tizio che invece di queste cose ha un idea precisa perchè le ha create per anni (ha scritto migliaia di pagine di manuali di ingegneria finanziaria) le banche saranno costrette ad esempio a riprendersi dai 1.000 ai 2.000 miliardi di $ di crediti che al momento hanno piazzato fuori dai loro bilanci (DUEMILA MILIARDI).
E allora ? Beh.. al momento secondo lui per ogni dollaro di capitale si fanno dai 25 ai 30 dollari di crediti nel sistema finanziario e il 60% del rischio di credito è stato trasferito tramite derivati a fondi hedge che usano una leva finanziaria di 1 a 10. E' stato costruito in castello di carte piuttosto fragile e di conseguenza negli anni a venire come minimo si farà fatica a trovare credito
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Sleight of hand will make the credit markets pay high price
By Satyajit Das
Published: December 12 2007 02:00 / Last updated: December 12 2007 02:00
Banks have been indulging in their version of the shell game - and this sleight of hand will have long-lasting implications for the credit markets.
To recap: the game requires three shells, under one of which is placed a small pea. The shells are shuffled around and bets are taken on the location of the pea.
"Risk transfer" is the shell game of the credit markets.
Regulators believe erroneously that if credit risk is distributed widely it reduces the chance of a crash. Risk transfer does not decrease risk but increases it in complex ways.
Banks originate loans that are securitised. Alchemy is used to convert risky debt, with the help of rating agencies, into AAA/AA asset-backed securities. The ABS is then sold to conduits that issue highly rated ABS-backed commercial paper to investors.
Alternatively, the high-quality ABS is sold to structured investment vehicles which then issue AAA-rated debt to fund the purchase. SIVs even purchase highly rated debt from other SIVs in an astonishing chain of risk. Highquality ABSs are sold to hedge funds that leverage the AAA-rated assets (up to 20-30 times) via banks willing to lend against the value of the securities. Debt seems to buy more debt in a spiral of borrowing. At each level, banks charge fees and earn margins from money they lend.
Risk transfer encourages declines in credit standards as the banks do not intend to hold the risk. The bank receives the difference between the interest on the loan and the return demanded by the investor "up front". As loans are sold off, ever larger volumes are necessary to maintain profitability.
The growth in the subprime market resulted from the necessity for banks to seek out new markets to generate volumes to fuel their high fixed-cost securitisation platforms.
Banks frequently don't actually sell off their real risks. They sell off less risky loans. In a collateralised debt obligation, the bank typically takes all or a portion of the riskiest securities - the equity tranche. This is "hurt money" or the "skin in the game" to reassure other investors. Banks must hold the loans until they can be sold. In a market disruption, if the bank is unable to sell then the risk remains with the bank.
But risk also returns to the bank via the back door. Where it acts as a prime broker - executing trades, settling transactions and financing hedge funds - the bank lends to investors using CDO securities as collateral.
The bank assumes risk to the value of the collateral. Banks provide liquidity - standby lines of credit - to the conduit vehicles to cover funding shortfalls. If commercial paper cannot be issued, then the banks end up holding the assets that they have supposedly sold off.
Risk transfer assumes that the risk is transferred to adequately capitalised investors. About 60 per cent of credit risk in recent years was transferred to leveraged hedge funds.
In modern credit markets, about one dollar of "real" capital might support between $20 and $30 of loans. Banks must hold $1 of capital against $12.50 of loans.
The higher leverage can only be sustained in a very low default rate environment. Credit risk also moves from a place where it was regulated and observable to a place where it is less regulated and more difficult to identify.
Thus, "transferred" credit risk is now finding its way back on to bank balance sheets as off-balance sheet structures and hedge funds are forced to sell. The total amount that will be re-intermediated by banks is unknown - probably, in the range of $1,000bn to $2,000bn.
The financial shell games that banks, with the tacit support of regulators, have played mean that credit markets are likely to remain sclerotic for years. Banks will reduce lending and need to raise new capital urgently to support the returning assets. As the risk transfer business winds down, the outlook for earnings from this activity will be reduced. Regulations for "risk transfer", that allowed this to happen, also need urgent reform.
There is a need for real rather than "false" risk transfer.
The writer is a risk consultant and author of Traders, Guns & Money: Knowns and Unknowns in the Dazzling World of Derivatives .