Mercati ed Azioni Americane

come ha fatto a essee giù del -50% con dei bonds corporate ?...

Secondo Bloomberg Sowood non ha nulla di immobiliare in pancia. Quello che sta avvenendo sul mercato è un flight to quality che sta penalizzando indistintamente il debito corporate. Se questo ha un senso con riguardo ai debiti dei grandi underwiter Usa ( vedere i loro CDS) ,molto meno lo ha per molti debitori. Citadel sembra avere acquistato a sconto della buona carta: potere di chi ha i quattrini quando manca liquidità. Hobi

ieri Citadel il mega fondo hedge da 12 miliardi del genio Ken Griffin ha detto che compra tutti i bonds del fondo hedge Sowood che aveva detto venerdì che perdeva un -50% (è pieno di bonds e CDO immobiliari e di altro genere) e questo ha rassicurato il mercato Il concetto è che 'sti hedge funds non fanno più mica il trading tipo compro gli S&P, vendo l'oro, compro Fiat e vendo IBM, questi fanno del gran credito, tipo banche ma ad esempio oggi persino Jim Cramer apre dicendo di vendere short una serie di società coinvolte nei mutui -------------------------- Jim Cramer Blog Sell Subprime's Dirty Dozen While You Can By Jim Cramer If it yields more than 10%, shoot it. That was the message of American Home Mortgage (AHM) . It is also the message of a host of others: RAIT Financial Trust (RAS) CapitalSource (CSE) NovaStar (NFI) Newcastle Investment (NCT) Gramercy Capital (GKK) with that cute reverse split, like that fooled anybody I hate these stocks. Every one of them. I don't even think they have an idea of how bad things are, just like American Home. I am giving Redwoods Trust (RWT) and Thornburg Mortgage (TMA) the benefit of the doubt because they did jumbo loans. But if they did jumbo loans -- for the allegedly rich -- in 2006, that benefit goes away because 2006 is all bad. You might get a chance to get these off your sheets today because of the so-called better than expected earnings from IndyMac (IMB) just now. I'd sell that one too because defaults are rising, which is all that matters right now. The overall tone of the market is also giving you a chance to get out. Consider yourself lucky. (I'm friends with some of the people who run these companies. I don't care anymore.) If I owned any of these companies in the plus-10%, non-benefit-of-the-doubt contingent--all part of my original dirty dozen that I didn't like months ago -- I would now sell them without limits. I most likely would short them against Redwood and Thornburg. I am sure they hard to borrow. Conservative investors could go short these brokers vs. Annaly (NLY) , which has no exposure to this junk. The twin lessons of Countrywide (CFC) -- there's no "prime" or "subprime," they're all just bad mortgage loans -- and American Home are that it simply isn't worth the effort to fight and defend. American Home collapsed overnight. So did Accredited (LEND) . Fremont (FMT) hangs on because it basically sold everything. I don't even know what it is anymore; I suspect Fremont doesn't either. If they say they do, I don't trust them. No self-respecting bank is going to lend any of these companies money, and if one did, I'd short it too because it would be obviously way too optimistic. I would short it because these companies have been cut off, cordoned, by the financial world. We are in the Wild West moment here where every one of these companies must be shot first and asked questions of later. That's

+0,76 SP in pre-apertura... 1492... Ho una voglia di rishortare...per la meta' chiusa... Giovanni, che facciamo??

July 30 (Bloomberg) -- ^Corporate Bond Risk Surges by Record as Subprime Losses Spread#http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=a4CHnE.bPy6s&refer=home^ July 31 (Bloomberg) -- the risk of holding corporate debt declined from a three-year high ^Paris Horvitz of AXA Says Bonds Overpriced on Subprime `Panic'#http://www.bloomberg.com/avp/avp.htm?clipSRC=mms://media2.bloomberg.com/cache/vHosTLGhkfQw.asf^

Mi sento di sposare in pieno l'opinione di J.P Hussman ( gestore di fondi Usa),che di seguito riporto. "The market currently exhibits neither favorable investment merit (based on valuations) nor favorable speculative merit (based on the quality of internal market action)." Hobi

Henry Kaufman credo abbia 85 anni ormai, era un guru del mercato del credito negli anni '70 però è molto chiaro ---------- The dangers of the liquidity boom By Henry Kaufman July 30 2007 In an interview with the Financial Times, Chuck Prince, chief executive of Citigroup, made this insightful remark: “When the music stops, in terms of liquidity, things will be complicated. But as long as the music is playing, you got to get up and dance. We’re still dancing.” Mr Prince was hinting at a conundrum investors and policymakers face as we float in a sea of liquidity. Why do our financial institutions hear music in expanding liquidity? One reason is that the concept itself has been liberalised since the second world war. In the postwar years, liquidity was by and large an asset-based concept. For companies, it referred to the size of cash and very liquid assets; the maturity of receivables; the turnover of inventory; and the relationship of these assets to total liabilities. For households, liquidity chiefly meant the maturity of financial assets being held for contingencies along with funds that reliably would be available later in life. Today, companies and households alike often blur the distinction between liquidity and credit availability. It is now commonplace, when envisaging assets present and future, to think in terms of access to liabilities. Money matters but credit counts. This new mindset has been abetted by at least three important structural changes. One is the tidal wave of securitisation that engulfed financial markets in recent decades. Conversion of non-marketable assets into marketable ones on a massive scale has changed the nature of financial assets as well as financial behaviour. Through securitisation, a vast array of assets once locked up in the portfolios of investors and lenders has been packaged, sold and resold alongside more traditional assets. Long-standing credit instruments have been joined by a long and diverse list of new ones, many extra­ordinarily complicated, even arcane. The sharp increase in tradable assets has stimulated risk appetites, eroded traditional concepts of liquidity and fostered the expectation that credit is always available at reasonable prices. Technological change also has bolstered the easy-credit outlook now common among investors. As markets have been linked globally by information technology networks, financial information flows nearly instantaneously, computerised trading is spreading and transactions are executed almost without delay. Investors can access financial data and participate in markets around the world and around the clock. This encourages a notion that markets for credit are always available and with near-perfect information. These two developments – securitisation and the seamless interconnectivity of markets – have brought intricate quantitative risk-modelling to the forefront of financial practices. Securitisation generates market prices while information technology appears to hold out the promise of quantifying pricing and risk relationships. The potency of this combination – its effect on risk taking – cannot be overstated. Armed with complicated modelling techniques, powerful computers and reams of historical market data, growing numbers of investors have become entranced with the dream of scientific rectitude. Few recognise, however, that such modelling assumes a constancy in market fundamentals that is illusory. No big financial institution wants to step off the dance floor while the music of liquidity is still playing. Doing so prematurely would risk the loss of enormous profits to competitors, declining earnings, eroding market share, employee dissatisfaction with bonuses and disgruntled shareholders. Executives are therefore loath to rely on judgment and reason in risk management. Rather, they are driven towards risk quantification and modelling, with their clear-cut timelines, aura of scientific certitude and lure of near-term profits. The common practice of marking to market poses hidden risks amid the vast array of securities flooding the market. Marking to market overstates values and gives investors a false sense of comfort. When liquidity seizes up, no one can truly claim that the last quoted price in organised markets or quoted by dealers in the over-the-counter market is the real market value without considering other factors. Today’s abundance of liquidity offers many short-term profit opportunities. But if the quality of debt continues to deteriorate, pressure will mount to expand the concept of liquidity even further, perhaps to absurd dimensions, and markets could turn the liquidity polka into a sombre march.

Certo che ... pensare ad un piano d'accumulo quando tutti cercano in ogni modo di forzarci ,aumentando l'inflazione ed il caro vita, a ricorrere al credito ... Per quanto ancora l'Italia verrà ricordata come il paese delle formiche ...

Ciao Norton, Tirati su il morale ... se vuoi sapere a cosa servono i soldi che investi ,considerando che ultimamente sento dire che "serve + politica" .... ^Maurizio Crozza#http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uZKN3V2emz0&feature=dir^

il calcolo è sbagliato :-(

In un ottica di 20 anni tipo pensione dove metti i soldi e poi non li tocchi più bisognerebbe scegliere i) le Aree geografiche migliori a lungo termine, probabilmente asia e sudamerica ii) in Settori che hanno potenziale a lungo termine e non sopravvalutati, tipo Energia ii) in Valute non sopravvalutate, tipo yen o asiatiche ii) società che costino poco, inteso come costino meno della media storica (non l'high tech ! non i finanziari !) a meno che non inizi in un periodo di alti tassi di interesse che cominciano a scendere come negli anni '80 se compri un paniere di 100 titoli che costano 20 volte gli utili quando la media storica è 13-14 volte gli utili può andarti bene per un anno o due, ma su dieci anni c'è la tendenza a tornare alla media Mese per mese ed anno per anno è la psicologia e la speculazione che conta, ma su un decennio alla fine prevale il valore intrinseco e oggi l'euro a 1.68 yen e 1.38 dollari è sopravvalutato almeno del 20%, le società europee costano più della media e l'europa causa la demografia è l'area che ha meno crescita a lungo termine Nel giro di qualche anno l'euro si può spaccare ad esempio e puoi avere una valuta che perde parecchio una volta che l'Italia sia di nuovo da sola Se dovessi iniziare oggi un piano pensionistico comprerei i) dei titoli giapponesi perchè il cambio da solo mi da un potenziale di apprezzamento e qui ci sono ETF di tutti i generi ii) dei panieri di materie prime, petroliferi, gas naturale, nucleare, carbone, soya, frumento, cotone... e anche qui gli ETF ci sono iii) dei biomedicali-farmaceutici e qui bisogna invece un poco scegliere

sono in euro cosa comprare , per ora ci sono quei 3 , penso che fra un pò ce ne saranno altri .

ma come risolvi la questione di "cosa comprare"? cioè gano ti farebbe comprare un etf sulla cina zibo uno sull'america beppe qualcosa fra brasile e ghana e il rischio cambio come l'annulli?

Ciao Norton, Sono in $ o in Euro ?

interessante il lyxor levdax di cui parli. Ma e' gia' quotato? non riesco a trovarlo. ---------------Marriot--------- sono su euronext borsa francese . Con Fineco li compro. per ora ci sono sulla borsa francese , tutti armonizzati : Cac Dax Nasdaq100 se mantengono la leva costante , con una certa frequenza, potrebbe capitalizzare anche la leva , o in parte