Politici che pagano e che la fanno pagare - GZ
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By: GZ on Sabato 05 Febbraio 2011 21:12
A proposito dei vizi di Berlusconi che paga queste donne, leggi il terrificante reportage sulla situazione dell'Irlanda del Michael Lewis questa settimana, di come stia sprofondando con i prezzi degli immobili calati del -50% e un buco delle sue tre maggiori banche pari al PIL, cioè il PIL dell'Irlanda che sono 5 milioni di persone era sui 120 miliardi.
^Tre banche hanno accumulato perdite (su crediti a costruttori) intorno a 100 miliardi di euro, quasi il PIL dell'Irlanda#http://www.vanityfair.com/business/features/2011/03/michael-lewis-ireland-201103?printable=true^. Come se in Italia Unicredit, Intesa e Monte Paschi da sole avessero perdite per 1.200 miliardi, perdite, buchi di bilancio. E il governo ha deciso di farli pagare al 100% agli irlandesi per cui hai disoccupazione al 15%, emigrazione di massa dall'Irlanda, calo del tenore di vita del -20%...
Sai perchè ? Cosa hanno deciso i politici irlandesi, gente che evidentemente è stata COMPRATA ? SI SONO ASSUNTI TOTALMENTE TUTTE LE PERDITE VERSO GLI INVESTITORI ESTERI, a nome dei contribuenti irlandesi.
Erano tre banche private che erano fallite ed erano state finanziate da speculatori e istituzioni finanziarie estere in gran parte, non da depositi di cittadini irlandesi. Invece di dire agli investitori esteri che avevano finanziato queste banche di prendersi delle perdite, le hanno nazionalizzate e hanno garantito al 100% tutti quelli che avevano bonds di Anglo-Irish e le altre.
Le banche estere si aspettavano di perdere un 50 o 80% sui bonds di queste tre banche irlandesi invece niente, i politici irlandesi hanno deciso, incredibie ma vero, di ripagarli interamente, a spese dei contribuenti e lavoratori irlandesi. Questi vedono già calare il loro tenore di vita del -20% (per ora) e solo per ripagare circa 80-100 miliardi di euro di bonds di tre banche private. Altro che Berlusconi che paga le mignotte. Qui in Irlanda hai i politici che si fanno pagare (o sono influenzati) da Goldman Sachs e il resto dei detentori di bonds e poi "la fanno pagare" carissima a cinque milioni di irlandesi. Meglio i politici che pagano delle donne o che quelli che te la fanno pagare come questi qui ?
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...^if the Irish wanted to save their banks, why not guarantee just the deposits? There’s a big difference between depositors and bondholders#http://www.vanityfair.com/business/features/2011/03/michael-lewis-ireland-201103?printable=true^: depositors can flee. The immediate danger to the banks was that savers who had put money into them would take their money out, and the banks would be without funds. The investors who owned the roughly 80 billion euros of Irish bank bonds, on the other hand, were stuck. They couldn’t take their money out of the bank. And their 80 billion euros very nearly exactly covered the eventual losses inside the Irish banks. These private bondholders didn’t have any right to be made whole by the Irish government. The bondholders didn’t even expect to be made whole by the Irish government. Not long ago I spoke with a former senior Merrill Lynch bond trader who, on September 29, 2008, owned a pile of bonds in one of the Irish banks. He’d already tried to sell them back to the bank for 50 cents on the dollar—that is, he’d offered to take a huge loss, just to get out of them. On the morning of September 30 he awakened to find his bonds worth 100 cents on the dollar. The Irish government had guaranteed them! He couldn’t believe his luck. Across the financial markets this episode repeated itself. People who had made a private bet that went bad, and didn’t expect to be repaid in full, were handed their money back—from the Irish taxpayer.
In retrospect, now that the Irish bank losses are known to be world-historically huge, the decision to cover them appears not merely odd but suicidal. A handful of Irish bankers incurred debts they could never repay, of something like 100 billion euros. They may have had no idea what they were doing, but they did it all the same. Their debts were private—owed by them to investors around the world—and still the Irish people have undertaken to repay them as if they were obligations of the state. For two years they have labored under this impossible burden with scarcely a peep of protest. What’s more, all of the policy decisions since September 29, 2008, have set the hook more firmly inside the mouths of the Irish public. In January 2009 the Irish government nationalized Anglo Irish and its 34-billion-euro (and mounting) losses. In late 2009 they created the Irish version of the tarp program, but, unlike the U.S. government (which ended up buying stakes in the banks), they actually followed through on the plan and are in the process of buying 70 billion euros of crappy assets from the Irish banks.
A single decision sank Ireland, but when I ask Lenihan about it he becomes impatient, as if it isn’t a fit topic for conversation. It wasn’t much of a decision, he says, as he had no choice. The Irish financial markets are governed by rules rooted in English law, and under English law bondholders enjoy the same status as ordinary depositors. That is, it was against the law to protect the little people with deposits in the bank without also saving the big investors who owned Irish bank bonds.
This rings a bell. When U.S. Treasury secretary Hank Paulson realized that allowing Lehman Brothers to fail was viewed not as brave and principled but catastrophic, he, too, claimed he’d done what he’d done because the law gave him no other option. But in the heat of the crisis, Paulson had neglected to mention the law just as Lenihan didn’t bring up the law requiring him to pay off the banks’ private lenders until long after he’d done it. In both cases the explanation was legalistic: narrowly true, but generally false. The Irish government always had the power to impose losses on even the senior bondholders, if it wanted to. “Senior people have forgotten that the government has certain powers,” as Morgan Kelly puts it. “You can conscript people. You can send them off to certain death. You can change the law.”
On September 30, 2008, in the heat of the moment, Lenihan gave the same reason for guaranteeing the banks’ debts that Merrill Lynch had given him: to prevent “contagion.” Tell financial markets that a loan to an Irish bank was a loan to the Irish government and investors would calm down. For who would doubt the credit of the government? A year and a half later, when suspicions arose that the banks’ losses were so vast they might bankrupt the government, Lenihan offered a new reason for the government’s gift to private investors: the bonds were owned by Irishmen. Up until then the government’s line had been that they had no idea who owned the bank’s bonds. Now they said that, if the Irish government didn’t eat the losses, Irish credit unions and insurance companies would pay the price. The Irish, in other words, were simply saving the Irish. This wasn’t true, and it provoked a cry of outrage from the credit unions, which said that they owned hardly any of the bonds. A political investigative blog called Guido Fawkes somehow obtained a list of the Anglo Irish foreign bondholders: German banks, French banks, German investment funds, Goldman Sachs. (Yes! Even the Irish did their bit for Goldman.)
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