ORO manipolato ?

Non preoccuparti, tesoro! Con internet sarà come se non me ne fossi mai andato. );-) Volevo solo precisare che io non odio affatto Berlusconi. A me Berlusconi fa semplicemente schifo! Parecchio schifo!!! E la cosa è profondamente diversa. L'odio presuppone comunque una certa forma di rispetto verso il soggetto odiato, mentre io non ne ho alcuno verso il datore di lavoro del 65% dei parlamentari italiani, del 90% dei giornalisti, e del 135% degli avvocati. P.S. - Mon cher, ogni tanto dovresti guardarla invece. Ti perdi degli spettacoli comici memorabili altrimenti. Come l'altro ieri, quando girovagando un po' tra i canali sono capitato su Rai1, nel momento esatto in cui stava iniziando la trasmissione del più viscido tra i cortigiani del Re (chiunque sia il Re nel dato momento). Tema della puntata: IL PRINCIPE AZZURRO!!! Ho cominciato a rotolarmi sul pavimento....ancora adesso, se ci penso ho problemi di continenza vescicale. Mia moglie ha ragione quando dice: "Voi italiani avete dei seri problemi!"

L'unica cosa sfavorevole è che non è negoziabile con un click in un secondo, come avviene per le azioni. ----------------------- beh... in un secondo no, ma in 5 o 10 secondi sì, l'oro è negoziabile, inteso come contratto sul ^Gold#^ future al Comex (oppure ^Silver#^ sempre al Comex) e hanno opzioni molto liquide su tutte le scadenze (cliccate sul link che abbiamo messo qui e vedete che sono più liquidi del fib30) I titoli azionari auriferi invece hanno il difetto che sono società non facilissime da capire dato che dipendono da quello che producono in miniere sparse giù per il sudamerica o africa o canada e a parte i 3 o 4 grossi come NEM, AU, Barrick... ogni tanto ci sono delle sorprese perchè sono titolini Inoltre ho appena letto uno studio per il quale in parte i titoli auriferi sono correlati con l'andamento degli indici di borsa, mentre il metallo invece è complemamente indipendente (Riguardo all'inarrestabile flusso di: odio-berlusconi-e-lo-ripeto-tutti-i-giorni che invade ogni topic di qualunque argomento ogni settimana come una volta si facevano le preghiere quotidiane si potrebbe fare come al bar dove gli avventori abituali dicono solo: ".. gianni, per me il solito eh..." e tutti capiscono senza dover ripetere tutto ogni giorno) Modificato da - gz on 1/23/2003 14:51:6

:-) Mon cher, giurami che anche se te ne vai all'estero, continuerai a mordere, almeno fino a quando ci saremo liberati dal cancheraccio. Ne ho bisogno per il mio equilibrio mentale: ieri sono passato vicino al televisore (spento, come sempre) e mi è sembrato di sentire un canto di sirene... "vieni con me e ti libererò da ogni peccato... con me potrai fare ciò che vuoi... aboliamo i reati e tutto si risolverà... i giudici potranno fare gli infermieri... i pm troveranno un lavoro in nero... costruiremo insieme il nuovo miracolo: carceri vuote e felicità per tutti..." 2ali

Tornando alle cose serie, qui c'è un ottimo articolo del noto terrorista conosciuto col nome di battaglia di Usemlab:^cliccaqui...#www.usemlab.com/html/commenti/archivio_commenti/commodities/CM_03_01_22.htm^ Può essere la spiegazione della relativa sottoperformance delle azioni aurifere rispetto al metallo. Ma dal basso delle mie conoscenze, vorrei suggerire che se il metallo continua a salire (come io penso che farà in breve tempo) fino ai 400 $ l'oncia, ci potrebbe essere una specie di resettamento: in sostanza, le azioni-opzioni potrebbero tornare ad essere out-of-money, con connesso elevatissimo delta rispetto ai movimenti del sottostante. E quindi potrebbero tornare a sovraperformare il metallo, come hanno fatto all'inizio del 2002. Detto questo, ritengo anch'io che i rischi minimi si abbiano solo col possesso dell'oro fisico. E questo per le ragioni esposte alla fine dell'articolo, e così sintetizzabili: l'oro (come l'argento, non dimenticatelo) è, a prescindere! L'unica cosa sfavorevole è che non è negoziabile con un click in un secondo, come avviene per le azioni. Ma magari lo sarà tra un po', quando i vari John Smith e Mario Rossi in giro per il mondo vorranno comprare solo oro. E quello sarà ovviamente il momento di vendere. Ma non tutto, perchè come ho già detto, in una gestione di portafoglio, un 10% di oro ed argento ci deve sempre essere. Soprattutto adesso che si prepara ad entrare nuovamente, e con forme nuove, nel sistema monetario internazionale.

Aaahh, pensavo quello che ha fatto i primi miliardi con speculazioni edilizie, finanziate con denaro che società svizzere, rigorosamente anonime, gli prestavano a miliardi perchè cantava bene. Ha presente? Quello che versava una caterva di miliardi (di 30 anni fa) come capitale sociale delle holdings a monte della Fininvest IN CONTANTI. Quello che sta preparando il terreno al prossimo condono: quello edilizio! Niente più demolizioni per le case abusive, ma tutti gli abusivi dovranno dotarle di giardino. Uno potrebbe anche morire dalle risate........

berlusconi quello che ha inventato il quadrato di nove di gann, con cui ha fatto i primi miliardi se la giorgia non ha visto il post e inserito le posizioni si può inviare una mail a giorgia@cobraf.com e rimediamo

Yes! Ma non capisco il riferimento a Berlusconi. Berlusconi CHI??? P.S. - Non c'entra niente, ma si potrebbe sapere perchè non vengono registrati il mio sell su GG, ed i buy su CRESY e TGS?

lo stile anglo-sassone, un post di argomentazioni a favore e uno contro in modo che chi legge si fa un idea indipendente mi ricorda le discussioni su berlusconi che ogni tanto arricchiscono il forum

PAR CONDICIO Tim Wood che fa le pulci a Blanchard's, ed in particolare al sell lanciato a fine 2001 (la più grande cannata nella storia del settore)........ _____________________________________ NEW YORK -- In late 2001, Blanchard & Company chairman and chief executive officer, Donald W. Doyle, begged clients to sell their gold bullion “before the price goes much lower” and to take advantage of tax losses. The eponymous New Orleans company that bills itself as America’s biggest physical gold dealer, recently filed suit against Barrick Gold and JPMorgan, blaming them for its “clients suffering substantial losses.” Clients who heeded the advice would have lost out on gains of around $80 an ounce year-over-year, certainly better than any returns offered from the broad numismatic market that was touted as the better alternative. Blanchard has possibly compromised its legal standing by claiming to be the premier gold bullion retailer in the US since it told clients that it would cease to carry gold inventory from 1 January 2002. It offered to continue buying gold from clients, but only if it could offset the transaction directly. That would have reduced its market share dramatically since competing dealers were only to happy to take over the business once the report was circulated. Doyle has also repudiated key sources used for his initial report, telling the BBC World Service in late December that gold producers and the World Gold Council published unreliable and misleading information. However, his report is peppered with approving references to reports supporting his case for gold crashing below $200 an ounce. More interestingly, Doyle has undergone a Damascene conversion over the hoary allegations of a global cabal suppressing the price of gold. “Manipulation? Yes. An actionable conspiracy? No,” blared a sub heading in the late 2001 Blanchard report entitled Gold Bullion: Caught in a Bear Trap.” In that section, Doyle patronized the gold manipulation related suit brought against key treasury-finance complex players by Boston lawyer Reg Howe as “reading like a good novel.” Doyle said Howe was off the mark because “the Fed can impact gold prices without being part of orchestrated sales at critical times and prices levels as… Howe alleges.” When gold stopped being money The Blanchard case has been warmly embraced by gold bugs despite Doyle declaring little over a year ago that gold prices had declined because it had lost its intrinsic value. “Gold bullion is no longer a hedge against inflation or falling stock prices. It is no longer a store of value. The very idea of gold’s intrinsic value – value that is not dependent upon the actions or promises of any government – publicly questioned by central bankers and by the heads of major financial institutions. Perhaps most importantly, gold is no longer insurance against economic, monetary and political crises, including war, that diminish the value of financial assets.” That paragraph ranks as one of the very worst calls on gold, especially since the metal, spearheaded by its equity derivatives, had been leading investment returns along with other real assets since late 2000. Nonsense has also been made of Doyle’s claim that “institutions and corporations that have the most money, the most gold, and the most information about gold and the most ability to influence gold’s price… have the power to slam the breaks on any increase in the price of gold, no matter how compelling the macroeconomic story behind the increase might be.” Supposedly all powerful, this faction has stood idly by while gold has blown through several stops on its way to $355 an ounce. Blanchard clients who bought the gold delinking thesis must have received a rude shock when, just as they looked into filing their losses, gold really took off and proved to be 2002’s best asset class if you were invested in its best-geared securities. That said, Doyle’s overall argument was reasonably cogent and lucid; although long-winded and rambling at times. The problem is that it was rather appallingly timed and the error has been compounded by wailing about a conspiracy and looking for a judge to agree. Indeed, the report quotes Andy Smith, Mitsui Metal’s supposed gold permabear, several times, but failed to mention the astute revisions to his outlook in the wake of the September 11 suicide assaults. No conspiracy Blanchard’s economic research team relied on several studies to conclude that gold is subject to manipulation, but not because of any conspiracy. Relying mostly on an unpublished lecture by Georgia University economics professors, William Lastrapes and George Selgin, Blanchard said the Fed actively targets the gold price in order to determine the best monetary policy. The academic study is praised as the “only extensive empirical research on the relationship between gold prices and monetary policy under fiat regimes.” Blanchard built on the study’s closing data (it covered 1982-95) and confirmed for itself that the “Fed uses significant, substantial increases in the price of gold as indicators of excess liquidity and inflationary expectations. Whenever the price of gold goes up 10% or more, the Greenspan Fed reduces bank reserves and raises interest rates, driving the dollar up and gold back down. “In the Greenspan era, every sustained, significant change in the price of gold has been followed by a significant tightening in Fed monetary policy.” This assertion jars against claims that gold has becoming progressively delinked from its monetary role, especially since additional research was dredged up to support the notion that central banks target the gold price. In other words, there is no better assurance that gold is money than a gold targeting policy among monetary authorities. This is a variation on the monetary policy arrangement proposed by Jack Kemp through the Reagan years and kept alive today by Jude Wanniski who lays claim to coining the term “supply-side”. Why might gold be going up now without any reaction from the Fed? The reason was very well described by Pimco bond fund manager, John Brynjolfsson, in this week’s Barron’s: “The [Fed] is going to wait until it sees the whites of the eyes of inflation before they tighten. And that’s a significant change from past policy, when they tightened at the first sign of recovery and were slow to ease. That was good policy for the 1980s and 1990s when they were bringing inflation down. Now inflation is so low that the Fed has changed its orientation 180 degrees. They will tend to ease at the first threat of weakness and be slow to raise.” Another way of looking at Brynjolfsson’s comments is that Blanchard made a key mistake in assuming that the Volcker-Greenspan condition was permanent. Apocalypse Blanchard warned clients that gold was “getting ready to topple because of the huge overhang of above-ground supplies that are now in the hands of institutions that don’t need them, don’t want them and are jockeying for position to get rid of them.” More worrying for Doyle were the weak hands of private gold investors who own 150 million ounces. "The demographic profile of these owners of gold bullion bars should give pause to anyone who believes that gold investors are incapable of acting decisively in divesting themselves of their gold… Investors know that the central banks want to sell their gold. Investors believe that the bullion banks and the producers will continue to make short sales of their gold. Investors are afraid that the central banks will sell all of their gold. Investors are even more afraid that other investors, who own twice as much gold as the central banks, will sell their gold.” [Emphasis original] The report closes melodramatically: “Today, wealthy US gold investors are at a crossroads at which they are neither buyers nor sellers of gold. The events of the past two years have insured that, at least in the short to medium-term, they will not choose to become buyers. If those investors choose to do nothing, the gold market will continue to decline and the overhang of their gold will continue to be a destabilizing factor. If those investors choose to sell their gold, the recent twenty-year lows in the gold market will be taken out very quickly. At some point, the owners of small bars and bullion coins will follow. A gold price of less than $200 per ounce will make the arguments for getting rid of US gold reserves even stronger. As 2004 approaches, and with it the end of Greenspan’s term as Chairman of the Fed, those gold reserves may lose their last advocate. The Washington Agreement will expire in 2004, and the European central banks can hardly be expected to stand idly by in the face of the threat of US sales, so the pace of European sales will accelerate. “Sell your gold and take advantage of your tax losses. At some point in the not too distant future, you'll be able to buy a whole lot more for a whole lot less.” It all comes down to the definition of “not too distant”. The filing of the case against Barrick and JPM indicates that Blanchard's definition fell within a year. It defies common sense that Blanchard now expects sympathy as the cuckolded partner of the defendent.

I mastini alle calcagna di JPM........ _______________________________ I have today mailed the following letter to the Enforcement Division of the Securities & Exchange Commission. It’s about time that we learn the truth regarding JP Morgan Chase’s activity in the gold market, the full extent of its gold exposure, and whether it used gold loans to fund the so-called "disguised loans" that it arranged for Enron. Perhaps the SEC will help us learn the truth by investigating these matters and reporting the results. Dear Sir/Madam: I am writing in regard to recent statements made by the management of JP Morgan Chase ("JPM") relating to its activity in the gold market. This is to ask for your determination whether their statements are false or misleading. On January 2nd JPM announced that it had reached an out-of-court settlement with several insurance companies regarding JPM’s involvement with Enron. You will recall that these insurance companies had initiated this litigation, alleging in their lawsuit brought in New York federal court that certain trading transactions between JPM and Enron were shams, thereby negating the insurance contracts covering these transactions. In a press conference subsequent to their January 2nd announcement, JPM management commented on rumors relating to its activity in the gold market. I refer to the following CBS.MarketWatch.com report by Luisa Beltran and Greg Morcroft published on January 2, 2003: "…[JP Morgan Chase] executives said that, despite persistent rumors to the contrary, it has no exposure to the recent run-up in gold prices. "We don't have any real exposure to gold. I don't know where that rumor keeps coming from, but it's not true," CEO Harrison said. "We have seen this rumor pop up again and again," added chief counsel McDavid, "and we have asked the SEC to look into it." I have no specific knowledge about these rumors, other than what I have learned from the media. But I am very pleased to hear that the SEC has been asked to investigate them. In this regard, I am writing to bring the following matters to your attention. Given that these so-called rumors "pop up again and again" as Mr. McDavid states, perhaps they have some basis in fact. It is a well-established truth that ‘buzz’ about a company will often circulate before an event. For example, rumors about derivative problems in Long Term Capital Management circulated well before that company’s collapse. More recently, word of potential problems in Enron circulated freely, much of which was reported in the media. The protracted drop in Enron’s share price for several months before the resignation of its CEO, which itself occurred three months before that company’s bankruptcy, was an indication that the market believed (as evidenced by that company’s declining share price) the rumors about Enron’s problems had some basis in fact. In both of these instances, company management denied that there was any substance to the so-called ‘rumors’ that were circulating, as JPM management has now also similarly done. I also bring to your attention the decline in JPM’s share price that occurred last year while these rumors about its gold exposure circulated. Thus, your investigation into the rumors about JPM’s activity in the gold market is timely, but the focus of your investigation should not be, as JPM management implies, how these so-called "rumors" started. Rather, your investigation should determine whether these rumors have any basis in fact. If they do, then this is to also ask for your determination whether the statements above by Messrs. Harrison and McDavid are false or misleading. To assist you, I would like to bring the following matters to your attention: 1) The Wall Street Journal published an insightful article about JPM and Enron on January 25, 2002 ("Insurers Balk at Paying Bank Up to $1 Billion in Claims On Complex Transactions"). That article provides an overview about the financing provided by JPM to Enron, through Mahonia Ltd., a company Chase Manhattan (one of JPM’s predecessor companies) established in the Channel Islands. The article states: "Prepaying for future delivery of a commodity is known as a "gold trade," because it is the way gold bullion has been trading for centuries. In recent years, trading companies, whether from Houston or Wall Street, have been making more use of this structure to buy and sell oil, natural gas and other commodities. Some commercial banks, including Chase Manhattan…had to set up part of these trades overseas because their banking charters wouldn't allow them to take delivery of commodities." The article describes what is generally known as a commodity swap, and gold is frequently used in one side of the transaction. As an ex-banker (1969 to 1980), I have some knowledge about how these transactions work, as banks are a facilitator for them. When gold is used to finance a commodity swap, bullion is borrowed from a central bank, and sold to raise dollars, which are then used to purchase the commodity on the other side of the transaction (oil and gas in the case of Enron). It is noteworthy that the WSJ article specifically mentions a "gold trade"; given this remark, anyone knowledgeable about commodity swaps might naturally assume that JPM/Mahonia was arranging gold-for-energy swaps for Enron. Thus, this WSJ article may be the original source of the so-called "rumors" referred to by JPM management. But importantly, this WSJ article also suggests that these rumors may have some basis in fact. The article did not specifically state from where Mahonia was obtaining the funding needed to purchase the commodity contracts it acquired from Enron (the so-called "disguised loans" which the insurance companies contended were shams). Nor did a WSJ article published August 13, 2002 ("Enron Probe Shines Harsh Light on Financiers") disclose the nature or the original source of the funding needed to complete these commodity swaps, but this later article does provide more information about potential gold activities by JPM in its dealings with Enron: "In the world of commodities, particularly gold trading, the 50-year-old Mr. Mehta [Chase’s and then JPM’s head gold trader] was well known. His successful marketing of derivatives, and his enthusiasm for the use of these instruments, helped the gold-hedging business take off in the 1990s. Mr. Mehta and his team executed…[deals which]…allowed Enron to use an offshore vehicle known as Mahonia to raise hundreds of millions of dollars from J.P. Morgan." Taken together, there are enough facts disclosed in these two WSJ articles to suggest that gold loans could be one possible source of funding for Mahonia’s commodity swaps with Enron, and if so, these gold loans could lead to the "gold exposure" denied by JPM management. 2) An article about Enron in The New York Times published on February 17, 2002, was important for the following statement [note the emphasis added by me]: "Partly because of the way the loans [by JPM/Mahonia to Enron] were accounted for, the company [i.e., Enron] reported a surge in its hedging activity, accomplished using financial contracts called derivatives, during its last few years. When pressed about the increase by skeptical analysts, Enron officials said the numbers reflected hedges for commodity trades, not new financing, the analysts said." The key point here is the "surge" in derivative contracts entered into by Enron "during its last few years". Each derivative has two-parties to the contract. It has not been disclosed to my knowledge who took the other side of the Enron contracts, but the following information from the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency offers one possible answer. According to its website, the OCC "charters, regulates, and supervises national banks to ensure a safe, sound, and competitive banking system that supports the citizens, communities, and economy of the United States." As part of this responsibility it collects derivative exposure of the nation’s banks. The disclosure by Chase Manhattan Bank (before its merger with Morgan Bank) is telling. In three years from December 31, 1997 to December 31, 2000, there was a surge in Chase’s gold derivative contracts from $11.8 billion to $29.8 billion. Because of the merger, it is not possible to determine from the OCC reports Chase’s derivative activity for 2001. But looking at the derivative exposure of JPM on a combined basis subsequent to its merger, it is noteworthy that after the Enron bankruptcy at the end of 2001, the gold derivative activity of JPM was unchanged at $41.0 billion reported at December 31, 2001 and $41.0 billion as of September 30, 2002, the latest reporting period available. Thus, Chase’s derivative contracts in gold surged while Enron’s derivative contracts surged, and then remained unchanged after Enron collapsed. This pattern suggests that it is possible Chase (and JPM as its successor) was the counter-party to Enron’s derivative contracts. Further, this growth in gold derivative contracts provides further evidence to the possibility I note above that gold was used by Mahonia to fund the commodity swaps (the so-called "disguised loans") that it entered into with Enron. The August 13, 2002 Wall Street Journal article states: "Mr. Mehta has had other high-profile scrapes with controversy while at the bank. For instance, Mr. Mehta came under fire for the bank's earlier arrangements with Sumitomo Corp., the Japanese trading company and the employer of a copper rogue trader named Yasuo Hamanaka who lost $2.6 billion in copper trades. Mr. Mehta's team structured a number of derivatives transactions that allowed Mr. Hamanaka to raise money that didn't appear to senior Sumitomo executives as debt, said people familiar with the deals." Thus, perhaps the rumors circulating about JPM’s gold exposure have some basis in fact. In any case, the above material does highlight the importance of your investigation. I note again Mr. Harrison’s statement: "We don't have any real exposure to gold." Perhaps in your investigation you can ask him to define the term "real". That JPM has exposure to gold is undeniable from the OCC reports. There are different kinds of exposure from derivatives – price risk and counter-party risk. It may be that through its derivative contracts, JPM believes that it does not have any price exposure to gold. However, while the gold market has been generally quiescent and its price relatively stable the past few years, gold has in recent weeks become very active. As we have learned from the collapse of Long Term Capital Management, volatility undermines what otherwise may appear to be a safe derivatives position. So we will see in the weeks and months ahead whether JPM’s derivative exposure to the gold price is indeed under control. Given the size of its position, it may be difficult for JPM to keep its price risk controlled. JPM’s gold derivative exposure of $41 billion of notional value represents 117 million ounces of gold – a number that is nearly 50% greater than all the gold produced worldwide in a year. Thus, it seems likely that the gold market may not be able to provide the liquidity JPM will need to keep its gold derivative position in balance in a period of increased gold price volatility, which is a result that would clearly negate Mr. Harrison’s contention that JPM does not have "any real exposure to gold." Then there is counter-party risk, which is always present because the financial position of companies changes. Counter-parties deemed creditworthy when JPM entered into derivative contracts may no longer be financially as strong as before. Further, if in fact the simultaneous surge in Enron’s and JPM’s derivative contracts was not just coincidental and that they were counter-parties to each other, one has to wonder whether JPM has any ongoing exposure to Enron in these derivative contracts. It is noteworthy that JPM’s most recent 10-Q shows that derivative receivables rose $16.4 billion, or 23.0%, in the nine months from December 31, 2001 to $87.5 billion as of September 30, 2002. The net change is actually 25.0% when adjusting derivative receivables as of December 31, 2001 to reclassify to Other Assets the Enron-related surety receivables from the insurance companies in the case now settled. Does this glaring (and potentially alarming) surge in derivative receivables reported by JPM reflect an inability of JPM’s counter-parties to deliver under their derivative contract commitments? And perhaps more importantly to help evaluate the accuracy and therefore reliability of Mr. Harrison’s statement, what portion of this derivative receivable relates to gold? The point is that certain aspects of JPM’s derivative disclosure appear to be inadequate. Thus, this is to ask that you make a determination in your investigation whether JPM’s disclosure about its gold derivatives has been sufficient, and indeed, whether the statements by its management about JPM’s gold exposure are not false or misleading. Lastly, your website states: "The laws and rules that govern the securities industry in the United States derive from a simple and straightforward concept: all investors, whether large institutions or private individuals, should have access to certain basic facts about an investment prior to buying it. To achieve this, the SEC requires public companies to disclose meaningful financial and other information to the public, which provides a common pool of knowledge for all investors to use to judge for themselves if a company's securities are a good investment." To achieve this objective, the SEC must investigate JPM in order to determine whether it is providing the investing public with sufficient disclosure on its gold exposure, which from the OCC reports is undeniable. Further, the SEC must determine whether the statements above by JPM management are false or misleading. I look forward to reading and learning the results of your investigation. For the sake of disclosure, I do not have any position in the stock of JPM. Yours truly, James Turk

Un aggiornamento sulla causa promossa da Blanchard contro JPM e Barrick...... by Chris Temple The Blanchard suit against Barrick and J.P. Morgan-Chase is, of course, a big story. The implications go far beyond what the current price of gold should be, and involve the financial health of banking houses and entire financial market sectors. As with GATA's earlier suit, Blanchard’s gets little attention in the "mainstream"/financial press. In fact, I have not yet seen a single mention of the Blanchard suit on CNBC, even with all the talk of gold spiking recently, and otherwise having a very good 2002. At least, a couple times in the past, they did have one or more GATA folks (or ones sympathetic to the "conspiracy theory") on if, perhaps, for no other reason than in the hopes they'd be ridiculed for their views. Just this morning, a Morgan big shot was on CNBC, and talked for a good 15 minutes about all their problems, known suits and UNKNOWN suits. He said that JPM would be establishing a nearly $1 billion separate account for settlements. He also discussed the bank's substantial derivatives exposure. But not a single word was uttered about Blanchard, Barrick or gold. Interestingly, Morgan put out a press release several months ago attempting to dispel any notion that it was in "trouble" due to gold-related contracts. I never did see any catalyst for this; yet all of a sudden, there was their announcement. No follow-up by the media, though; as with today, most of their interest is about Enron-related stuff. But for Morgan to have issued such a statement seemingly out of the blue, you know there had to be serious enough "scuttlebutt" for them to feel the need to respond. The important thing to remember about both GATA's and, presumably, Blanchard's actions is that they are motivated by something more than the price of gold, and/or some "gold bugs" just being angry that their favorite investment has been a poor performer for so long. In any case, that point has in the past been articulated to me well by GATA's Bill Murphy. The real "story" here is how gold has been used as a vehicle for speculators to engage in, ultimately, very risky financial behavior. Far from being an issue solely of gold's "forced" or otherwise contrived underperformance as an asset class/investment, it's one of shenanigans (short selling, arbitrage, derivative trading and the rest) having been engaged in that threaten the health of several financial institutions, and even the whole monetary/financial structure itself. Much has been written (by me and others) of the "carry trade" that helped gold decline from over $400 per ounce in January, 1996 to lows near $250 per ounce. Most of those who engaged in this activity (generally consisting of borrowing gold from central or bullion banks, selling it and investing the proceeds elsewhere at higher returns than the lease rate cost for the gold) had no feelings for gold one way or another. They simply saw an opportunity to exploit a thin market for short-term financial gain. Some claim, though, that many of these contracts are overextended; and that if everyone short gold had to purchase metal to cover, it would be impossible. Producer hedging also served to push gold down; but this practice started to come into disrepute in the Fall, 1999 short squeeze. When market prices rose higher than hedge contracts' selling price for forward-sold gold, that meant these contracts became major LIABILITIES to the companies who'd hedged their production. Specifically, two companies--Ashanti and Cambior--were brought to their knees financially when their hedge books plunged under water for a while. Curiously, Barrick--the biggest and most sophisticated player by far among gold hedgers--escaped this fate; and has continued to, so far. When it has at times been questioned about its own potential losses if gold were to move substantially higher, Barrick has usually stated that it has little or no adverse exposure; in effect, that its hedge contracts are a "win/win" situation. In short, it has somehow been able to construct hedges that it can wiggle out of for quite a while if the company’s bet on a falling gold price were not to materialize. Following is an explanation of this practice contained in a recent issue of Strategic Investment newsletter: "Ordinarily, a hedge protects a producer or investor from the downside. Other things being equal, it does so by limiting their upside. Barrick, whose hedge book had assets of $5.5 billion at the end of 2001, however, has managed to construct a hedge that allows it considerable upside if gold rises. And one big bank could be caught very short. Apparently, Barrick has hedged part of its production through a spot deferred forward sale contract. Barrick makes a forward contract with a bank to deliver (unmined) gold at a certain price at a certain date. But what makes these contracts different, and also dangerous, for counter-parties is that Barrick has the right to defer the delivery of the gold for periods ranging from five to 10 years. More recently, Barrick seems even to have entered into contracts that allow it to defer delivery for 15 years. . ." The piece in S.I. continues, referring to information and opinions apparently obtained from Len Williams, head of fixed income and commodity research at London-based Durlacher. "According to Williams, while deferring or rolling over a contract is not unusual in the financial world, it can usually be done for only a short period and both parties have to agree. But Barrick appears to have pulled off a coup by writing extended-length contracts that allow it to take the decision unilaterally. This can be very lucrative for Barrick. Say gold is trading at $300 an ounce and Barrick agrees to sell Bank X one million ounces of gold at $320 an ounce in 12 months. If gold then trades at $310 an ounce one year later, Barrick will sell the gold to the bank and receive a better price than it would get elsewhere. But if gold has shot up to $350, Barrick can choose to defer the sale to the bank, and sell its gold in the market. This gives it the best of both worlds—little risk and the highest price available. "If you are Bank X holding the obligation to buy the one million ounces at $320 per ounce, then you need to hedge this position in the market. Standard gold futures contracts have no deferral clauses, so you sell forward the gold that you don’t have, which means, you are now relying on Barrick to deliver the gold so you can fulfill your end of the bargain. If Barrick decides to defer the sale, though, there could be trouble—which is what we hear could happen. Apparently, one sizeable bank active in this market has a gold derivatives book of $41 billion, a significant part of which is attributable to its dealings with Barrick. Barrick’s contract apparently has the option to defer any sale. If the gold price starts to accelerate, Barrick could choose to defer and the bank will have to find some other way to get the gold it needs to fulfill its own obligations. How will it do that? It will have to buy the gold—potentially hundreds of millions of dollars worth—in the market. A forced buyer of that size would send gold rocketing to $400 or even $450 an ounce, prices not seen since the early 1980’s. You may have a question: How could a bank do something so risky? . . ." (Emphasis added.) That question, of course, is the intriguing part of this. Though not completely out of the realm of possibility, nobody is suggesting that the venerable House of Morgan is so stupid as to have engaged in such a consistently one-sided arrangement without an "outlet" or fail-safe of its own. This is where things could get interesting, if Blanchard succeeds in obtaining this kind of information in a courtroom down the road. About all we can do right now is speculate; but the fact that it was J.P. Morgan that—not coincidentally, in my opinion—acted as the conduit for the New York Federal Reserve Bank to end gold’s short squeeze from September 29-October 5, 1999 provides perhaps the strongest possible clue. I for one do not believe that Morgan can or will be done in by its gold dealings, though it’s possible that some others Morgan might have offloaded risk on to could be in greater danger. Its exposure to telecommunications and energy bad debts is by all available information substantially larger. Investors—and gold investors, in particular—have for months now been smelling trouble where Barrick is concerned, however. Barrick’s share price has been clearly the worst performer among gold majors; and not due solely to the fact that it was jettisoned from the S&P 500 during 2002. At the least, investors are suspicious of its hedges and potential future exposure to a sustained gold bull market; in any case, the more glamorous stocks to own now are those producers who remain unhedged. We must go beyond even this, though, to wonder what this mining giant’s fate might be. Last Fall, the company made more than one announcement warning of production shortfalls, earnings woes and more. Many are asking what on Earth is going on. With declining production, can the company keep all its long-term obligations to deliver gold at any price? Now the ugly duckling in the sector, will Barrick have the clout necessary to purchase more and better production? Does its reduced earnings for 2002 mean that—already—the company is having to eat some recent losses on its hedge book; losses it’s tried to tell investors were virtually impossible? Nobody really knows for sure right now. But there are lots of questions; and Barrick’s share performance especially during the second half of 2002 tells us that something may be badly amiss. The Barrick dealings with Morgan do not involve a huge amount of gold, within the context of the overall short position which is said to exist. Blanchard’s going after these two, though, represents an achievable means of eventually blowing the lid off the entire universe of gold "manipulation." And—given Barrick’s position as a producer in particular—the antitrust case is arguably the easiest to make against them. Time will tell whether the Blanchard action goes anywhere; but as I wrote recently, it stands a far better chance than did GATA’s action.

Il mercato non ha mai risposto nè in positivo nè in negativo a notizie dalla corea. Non c'è nessun indizio di conflitto con la corea del nord che è un problema per la corea del sud che ha un grosso esercito e si occupa lei del suo vicino. Finora al'america ha cercato di stare fuori, al di là di qualche dichiarazione, dalla corea anche perchè parlarne vuole dire ricordare che 80 mila soldati americani ci sono morti nel 1952-53 è come tirare fuori il vietnam Ultimamente sembra che la corea del nord stia aiutando l'Iran a costruire un impianto nucleare e questo può diventare un problema, ma perchè è l'iran che viene temuto

C'è anche un'altra cosa che rafforza quello scenario del superoro: 1. Bush un anno fa ha detto che la guerra al terrorismo non si ferma prima di averlo sradicato. 2. tra le nazioni su cui ha puntato l'indice c'è la Corea del Nord. Ora la Corea del Nord sta riaprendo i siti nucleari e tutti parlano del pericolo che rappresenta per la Corea del SUD, MA SE colleghiamo queste riaperure alle parole di Bush e alla sua intransigenza contro saddam, non è che sia tanto difficle ipotizzare hce possono aver pensato di essere il prossimo obbiettivo di Bush dopo Saddam che, comunque vada, guerra o pace, tra pochi mesi potrebbe essere tutto finito e se hanno il dubbio di essere l'obbiettivo che segue diventa logico che cominciano a rirmarsi, in fondo già quando ancora non era terminata l'azione in afghanistan di diceva che dopo sarebbe toccato a saddam, quindi che ora la Corea del nord cominci a prepararsi sarebbe logico, solo che lìc'è il nucleare e lo scenario si complica moltissimo cosa che accellera le direzioni opposte di borse e oro; naturalmente non perchè non voglio vedere ciò che accade, ma semplicemente perchè un value investor va sempre al rialzo questo non è un motivo per smobilitare i titoli, ma rivaluta le parole di Buffett che pur essendo sempre al rialzo ha previsto nper i prossimi dieci anni un crescita più contenuta delle quotazioni, perchè è anche vero che in dieci anni la crescita sarebbe sempre maggiore degli anni in perdita, a meno che siamo davanti ad un fatto nuovo e pur con tutte le novità in giro non mi sembra che ci siano le premesse, ciao massimo

Ecco un opinione abbastanza autorevole (da parte di ^BREAKINGWIEWS#WWWW.BREAKINGWIEWS.COM^ che bene o male passa per uno dei commenti finanziari indipendenti migliori in europa) che dice che l'oro può arrivare a 3.400 dollari l'oncia. Il che significherebbe dai 345 dollari attuali un aumento di 10 VOLTE TANTO (e questo ovviamente implicherebbe che i titoli auriferi salirebbero di 15-20 volte perchè per loro ogni dollaro di aumento dell'oro sopra i loro costi di produzione va direttamente nei loro utili). Il ragionamento è che nel 1980 l'oro arrivò a 850 dollari l'oncia sulla scia di una instabilità e crisi monetaria generale e quindi questo prezzo va usato come termine di riferimento. Da allora in media il reddito usa è cresciuto in termini nonminali del 6.3% annuo. Dato che stiamo arrivando in una situazione simile a quello del 1980 (secondo breakingviews) a causa degli eccessi di indebitamento e degli squilibri finanziari mondiali, applicando un tasso di crescita del 6% di aumento annuo al prezzo di 850 dollari l'oncia ottieni come obiettivo attuale per l'oro 3.400 dollari circa. Un opinione piuttosto radicale ma interessante e per i dettagli del ragionamento leggi sotto. ----------------------------- Christopher Wood ^WWWW.BREAKINGWIEWS.COM #WWWW.BREAKINGWIEWS.COM^ The key point is that is the only form of money that is not part of the credit system. Remember that all forms of "cash" are a claim on someone or something. Unfortunately, the fiat currency system has been massively abused - nowhere more so than in America - by, ironically, former gold-bug Pinball Alan. This talk about gold will astonish most people under the age of 40 who view gold as a commodity and not as money. This unfortunate drawback will make them late to the party. Still all is not lost. The gold shares are lagging bullion at present. The sector's biggest blue chip, Newmont, is trading at the same level as it was in September when the price of bullion was 7% lower. Mainstream closet-indexing money also has barely tip-toed into gold shares. Indeed the gold-mining share universe is still capitalised at less than one single tech stock, Dell Computer. GREED & fear's advice remains that every sort of investor - institutional or retail; absolute return or relative return - should hold core positions in bullion and unhedged gold shares, the latter preferably suitably geographically distributed. The next resistance level on the charts for bullion is the 370-380 level. Gold could get there quickly because there are at present a lot of commercial short positions outstanding. The commercials had a short position of 128,689 gold futures contracts on 10 December. As for the long-term price target on bullion, one way of guaging this is to adjust the 1980 peak gold price of US$850/oz by the 6.3% annualised growth in US personal income which has occurred since then. The answer gives a gold price target of US$3,437. This seems eminently achievable as a peak for the long-term bull market in gold which has now begun. Gold should then not be viewed as a trade. Rather it is in a multi-year bull market which is climbing the classic wall of worry. Gold will rise as confidence in the ludicrous powers still attributed to central bankers wanes. Faith in the Fed is a lot weaker than it was three years ago given the evident failure of monetary easing thus far. But if the Fed is a stock, it still has far further to fall. Dollar Another reason gold is rising is because of the lack of currency alternatives. The US dollar index has now broken conclusively out of its July to October trading range (see Figure 3). Still its decline is being slowed by the lack of obvious paper options among the world's major fiat currencies. Certainly both the Japanese and Europeans are going to start fretting if the yen and euro appreciate by a few more percentage points against the dollar. The deflationary implications are particularly grim for Japan and Germany, as they remain excessively dependent on manufacturing. In this respect, Japan and Germany are more likely than the much more service-orientated American economy to lose jobs to China. This is why Tokyo and Brussels will be agitating for a stronger renminbi, or a "new Plaza Accord", long before Washington. Still the risk for these countries is clearly that the dollar continues to weaken. All that this requires is for less foreign capital inflow into America. That seems likely given the waning enthusiasm for investing in America. The risk here is how much foreigners already own in America as a result of years of aggressive buying into the peak of the bull market, and therefore how much they could potentially sell. And the more foreigners sell the more it will send a message that they are no longer willing to finance American consumption. Foreigners held US$7.4tr of US financial assets at the end of 3Q02, amounting to 70% of US GDP, of which US$1.8tr is in government securities, US$1.2tr in equities and US$1.3tr in corporate bonds. They owned a record-high 22.5% and 12.7% respectively of US corporate bonds and US stocks, and 32% of US treasury securities outstanding. The other side of a weaker dollar is rising commodity prices. The CRB index hit a five-year high of 237 this week. It is interesting to note that commodities are strong across the board. Gold and oil are strong for specific reasons. Their strength does not surprise GREED & fear; indeed it is to be expected. Still the issue is whether the overall strength of commodities is indicating that inflation warning signals are being flashed. This is not the view here. The strength of commodities should be viewed as partly an indication of dollar weakness and partly a reflection of just how depressed commodity prices were, though there is probably also an element of hedge fund trend-following momentum in the CRB move of late. Still there is a clear valuation story behind the commodity price move. GREED & fear was reminded of this when reading a book written by GREED & fear's old friend Marc Faber, which has just been published by CLSA Books (Tomorrow's Gold - Asia's age of discovery, December 2002). The author has been positive on commodity prices for some time from the sensible contrarian perspective that commodity prices have been completely shunned due to the growing obsession in the past 20 years with financial assets. Thus, at its recent bottom in October, the CRB index was at its lowest in real terms in at least 80 years, according to Tomorrow's Gold. In GREED & fear's view it is quite possible that commodity prices have indeed bottomed even though government bond prices have not yet peaked. And the view here remains that government bond prices have not peaked, or yields bottomed, since bond markets have yet to celebrate forced deleveraging by American consumers and indeed consumers in other Anglo Saxon appendages. It is this final deflationary shock that will send the 10-year bond to 3%, the 30-year treasury bond to 4%, and the federal funds rate still lower. GREED & fear is this week formally lowering the long-standing federal funds rate target here from 1% to 0.5% Modificato da - gz on 12/23/2002 3:14:14

NEW YORK (CBS.MW) -- Gold prices traded as high as $343 an ounce Tuesday, their highest level since June 1997, as mounting concerns of a war with Iraq dragged the U.S. dollar lower, enticing traders to take defensive investment measures. On the New York Mercantile Exchange, gold for February delivery rose as high as $343 an ounce before easing back to close at $338 an ounce, up 40 cents. Ongoing worries about a conflict between the United States and Iraq, renewed tensions with North Korea and the dollar's retreat "have been serious factors" behind the rally in the gold market, said Frederic Panizzutti, an analyst at GoldAvenue, a major online trading company. In Iraq, U.N. arms inspectors turned their search activities Tuesday to the Baghdad University campus, looking for evidence of weapons of mass destruction. U.S. officials have said that a 12,000-page report on banned weapons submitted by Iraq on Dec. 7 lacks critical facts, including failure to account for a number of missing chemical and biological weapons. Late Monday, Secretary of State Colin Powell said the U.S. had problems with the Iraqi weapons report. A full U.S. review of the report could be released later this week. And U.S. tension with North Korea has climbed following word of the communist country's plan to restart its nuclear weapons program. Against this backdrop, Weiss Research financial analyst Kevin Kerr said he could envision a scenario in which "investment banks with huge short positions [in gold] are going to start feeling the worst kind of squeeze imaginable, and they should have to start unwinding their short positions in a hurry." "The investment banks saw an opportunity to short a commodity [gold] they felt would never regain its value," Kerr explained, adding that their reason was likely based on "greed and lack of foresight." It's a "big mistake," he said, "now they're stuck in a big way." The investment banks' move to quickly unwind their short positions could "light a fire under the price of gold," Kerr said, prompting further price spikes. l'articolo è su CBS Modificato da - Liuk on 12/18/2002 15:46:0