Cina vs. resto del mondo

la verità sulla Cina - gz  

  By: GZ on Domenica 22 Aprile 2007 05:55

------------ The Truth About China April 20, 2007 By Guy Sorman The Western press is full of stories these days on China's arrival as a superpower. A steady stream of Western political and business delegations visit Beijing, confident of China's economy, which continues to grow rapidly. Investment pours in. Crowning China's new status, Beijing will host the 2008 Summer Olympics. But after spending all of 2005 and some of 2006 traveling through China—visiting not just her teeming cities but her innermost recesses, where few Westerners go, and speaking with scores of dissidents, Communist Party officials, and everyday people -- my belief that the 21st century will not belong to the Chinese has only been reinforced. True, 200 million of China's subjects, fortunate to work for an expanding global market, are increasingly enjoying a middle-class standard of living. The remaining one billion, however, are among the poorest and most exploited people in the world, lacking even minimal rights and public services. The Party, while no longer totalitarian, is still cruel and oppressive. Its mendacity has been fully displayed in China's AIDS crisis. The problem is gravest in Henan province, where an untold number of poor peasants contracted AIDS during the 1990s from selling their blood plasma—a process that involves having their blood drawn, pooled with other blood and then, once the plasma has been removed, put back into their bodies. China didn't conduct HIV tests and therefore ended up infecting donors by giving them back tainted blood. Victims are now reportedly dying in the hundreds of thousands. The government's initial reaction was to deny that the problem existed, cordon off AIDS-affected areas and let the sick die (a pattern that the government tried to repeat when SARS broke out). In this case, police barred entry to villages where infected people lived (new maps of the province even appeared without the villages). Forced to acknowledge the problem after the international media began reporting on it, the Party nonetheless continues to obfuscate. When Bill Clinton visited Henan in 2005 to distribute AIDS medicine, for example, the Party prevented him from visiting the worst-off villages. Instead, in Henan's capital city, he posed with several Party-selected AIDS orphans as the cameras clicked. It was an elaborate public-relations charade: China, with the West's help, was tackling AIDS! Had Mr. Clinton been given a tour by Hu Jia, a human-rights activist, a far grimmer picture would have emerged. Only 30, he is a democrat and a practicing Buddhist who favors Tibetan independence. In 2004, Mr. Hu gave up studying medicine to look after Henan's sick. Months after Mr. Clinton's photo-op, Mr. Hu and I traveled to one of the villages that the former president missed: Nandawu, home to 3,500 people. It's not hard to visit—you can get past the police checkpoint at the village's entrance by hiding under a tarpaulin on a tractor-trailer, and the police fear AIDS too much to enter the village itself. What I saw there, however, will remain with me forever. The disease inflicts at least 80% of the families there; in every hovel we entered an invalid lay dying. Most of the sufferers had no medicine. One woman put a drip on her sick husband, a man who has been bedridden for two years and who is covered with sores. What did the bottle contain? She didn't know. Why was she doing this? "I saw in the hospital and on television that sick people had to be put on the drip." As long as Mr. Hu worked alone to help the sick, bringing them clothes, money and food, the Party left him alone. But he has recently drawn attention to himself by urging the victims to form an organization that can demand more from the government. The Party will sometimes put up with isolated dissent, but it won't tolerate an "unauthorized" association. Several months ago, the government placed Mr. Hu under house arrest in Beijing. But dissent cannot be stifled everywhere. There has been an explosion of revolts in the vast countryside. The government estimates the number of public clashes with the authorities (some occurring in the industrial suburbs too) at 60,000 a year. But some experts think that the true figure is upward of 150,000 and increasing. When, in late 2006, I reached one village in the heart of the Shaanxi Province after a 40-hour journey from Beijing by train, car and tractor, I saw no trace of an uprising that had taken place a month earlier. Alerted by a text message sent from the village, the Hong Kong press had reported a violent clash between the peasants and the police, leaving people injured and missing or even dead, with the authorities spiriting away the bodies. I pieced together the reasons that had provoked the uprising. The village had a dilapidated school, without heating, chalk or a teacher. In principle, schooling is compulsory and free, but the Party secretary, the village kingpin, made parents pay for heating and chalk. Then a teacher came from the city who wanted to be paid more than his government wages. He demanded extra money from the parents. Half of the parents, members of the most prosperous clan, agreed; the other half, from the poorer clan, refused. A skirmish erupted, and the teacher fled. The Party secretary tried to intervene and was lynched. Then the police roared in with batons and guns. The school has reopened, the teacher replaced with a villager who knows how to read and write but "nothing more than that," he admits. The uprisings express peasants' despair over the bleak future that awaits them. Emigration from the countryside might be a way out, but it's not easy to find a permanent job in the city. All kinds of permits are necessary, and the only way to get them is to bribe bureaucrats. The lot of the migrant—and China now has 200 million of them—is to move from work site to work site, earning a pittance at best. The migrants usually don't receive permission to bring their families with them, and even if they could, obtaining accommodation and schooling for their children would be virtually impossible. The fate of Chinese citizens often depends on where they are from. Someone born in Shanghai is considered an aristocrat and conferred the right to housing and schooling in Shanghai. Someone born in a village, however, can only go to the village school, until a university admits him -- a rare feat for a peasant. An American scholar, Feiling Wang, had come to China to study this system of discrimination, which few in the West know about, but the government expelled him. Villagers often told me that it wasn't the local Party secretary whom they most hated, but rather the family-planning agents who enforce China's one-child policy, often subjecting women to horrific violence. The one-child policy is not only monstrous, it is yielding an increasingly elderly population in need of care—a problem that a poor country like China is unprepared to handle. Will China's surging economic growth end the rumbling discontent? Not according to the esteemed economist Mao Yushi, under house arrest for asking the government to apologize for the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre. He doesn't trust the Party's claims of a 10% annual growth rate -- and why believe the official statistics when the Party lies so consistently about everything? Doing his own calculations, he arrives at a rate of about 8% per year, vigorous but no "miracle," as some in the West describe it. Moreover, he believes that the current growth rate isn't sustainable: natural bottlenecks—scarcity of energy, raw materials, and especially water—will get in the way. Also, Mr. Mao says, the fact that investment decisions frequently obey political considerations instead of the market has helped generate an unemployment rate that is likely closer to 20% than to the officially acknowledged 3.5%. Many in the West think that Chinese growth has created an independent middle class that will push for greater political freedom. But what exists in China, Mr. Mao argues, is not a traditional middle class but a class of parvenus, newcomers who work in the military, public administration, state enterprises or for firms ostensibly private but in fact Party-owned. The Party picks up most of the tab for their mobile phones, restaurant bills, "study" trips abroad, imported luxury cars and lavish spending at Las Vegas casinos. And it can withdraw these advantages at any time. In March, China announced that it would introduce individual property rights for the parvenus (though not for the peasants). They will now be able to pass on to their children what they have acquired—another reason that they aren't likely to push for the democratization of the regime that secures their status. Because China's economy desperately needs Western consumers and investors, China's propagandists do all they can to woo foreign critics. "Do you dare deny China's success story, her social stability, economic growth, cultural renaissance and international restraint?" one Party-sponsored scholar asks me in Paris. I respond that political and religious oppression, censorship, entrenched rural poverty, family-planning excesses and rampant corruption are just as real as economic growth in today's China. "What you are saying is true, but affects only a minority yet to benefit from reforms," he asserts. Yet nothing guarantees that this so-called minority—one billion people!—will integrate with modern China. It is just as possible that it will remain poor, since it has no say in determining its fate, even as Party members get richer. The scholar underscores my fundamental assumption: "You don't have any confidence in the Party's ability to resolve the pertinent issues you have raised." That's true. I don't.


  By: Fortunato on Mercoledì 28 Marzo 2007 02:43

Ed infatti Zibordi, stiamo vivendo proprio questo periodo, dal momento che sono gli stessi governi che si stanno lamentando della troppa invadenza delle banche centrali che, per nostra fortuna, stanno bacchettando gli stessi capi di governo. Ora si tratterà di fare in modo che esistano governi diversi dagli attuali che possano riprendere in mano una situazione ormai del tutto degenerata. Fortunato

più la cosa dura e peggio sarà quando finisce - gz  

  By: GZ on Mercoledì 28 Marzo 2007 02:32

le banche centrali sono il governo e la burocrazia, se fossero in grado di pianificare e programmare l'economia sarebbe la prima volta che succede nella storia il gioco sta funzionando perchè hanno le banche, le banche d'affari, gli hedge funds e i private equity che stanno facendo miliardi e quindi "collaborano" diciamo, ma come spiega ai suoi partner nel memorandum che è stat pubblicato dal Washington Post il capo del Carlyle Group, forse l'investitore più astuto che ci sia oggi in giro assieme a Schwarman di Blackstone "questa situazione di eccessiva liquidità non può continuare ...più la cosa dura e peggio sarà quando finisce.."


  By: Fortunato on Mercoledì 28 Marzo 2007 01:29

Zibordi, pienamente d'accordo ma tutto ciò accadrà quando decideranno le banche centrali, non prima come nel 1997. Occorre uno scopo e un fine a carattere generale, tra l'altro non posso biasimare la politica monetaria delle banche centrali, anche se Bernanke non lo ritengo all'altezza degli altri. Forse per questo lo hanno messo sotto tutela e gli inetrventi di Greenspan si intensificheranno, penso. Fortunato


  By: GZ on Martedì 27 Marzo 2007 15:46

...Quando la banca del Giappone ricomincerà a pompare liquidità su richiesta del sistema lo yen probabilmente ricomincerà ad indebolirsi ed una bella scommessa contro ci sta tutta( anche perchè a termine vale il 4,75% in + contro dollaro).... ---------------- ci sono due fatti macroscopici, grandi come una casa 1) in febbraio lo Yen rispetto al paniere di tutte le altre valute è sceso al minimo degli ultimi 20 anni 2) il surplus di bilancia dei pagamenti rispetto a tutti i paesi del mondo e in particolare Europa ed America del Giappone è oggi al livello maggiore della storia Cioè i giapponesi a forza di svalutare il cambio ora stanno esportando alla grande accumulando riserve in dollari, euro e sterline a livelli record Tutto questo non ha senso, che un paese super-competitivo come il Giappone abbia bisogno di tenere i tassi allo 0.5% in modo che i capitali escano dallo Yen, lo yen si svaluti e così venda più Toyota massacrando General Motors e Ford e accumuli surplus enormi mentre europa ed america accumulano deficit enormi Lo Yen deve salire del 20% almeno, questa manipolazione dei tassi e del cambio un bel giorno finisce e come nel 1997 un giorno ti alzi e c'è stato il botto e lo Yen è salito del 10% in un giorno


  By: Esteban on Martedì 27 Marzo 2007 13:37

Salve ... Non ci sono pasti gratis in borsa ... be in certi momenti capita ... Come posso acq. titoli della borsa di shenzhen ... c'è modo ? Si riesce a fare uno special sulla cina ( sino a quando ne vale la pena ? ) Quasi ogni titolo ha praticamente + che duplicato il proprio valore appena dopo il 26 ... come rubare le caramelle ai bambini. Quì non c'era da far fatica ... scrivevo : 26 April 2006 0:36 Se uno invece volesse investire su di uno strumento simile, ma legato sullo shenzhen . Chiedo perchè li quasi tutte le società stanno superando la MM250gg . Nel caso di investimento lungo 1/3 anni esiste qualche cosa in merito ? oppure è un mercato troppo leggero rispetto ad Hong kong ? Ci possono essere dei problemi in questo senso ?


  By: Gano* on Lunedì 05 Marzo 2007 17:31

Anch'io. Starei infatti attento a vendere la pelle del (carry trade) prima di averlo impallinato.


  By: defilstrok on Lunedì 05 Marzo 2007 15:22

Hobi: "...e quindi i carry trade riprenderanno perchè l'interesse generale è per uno yen debole". ---------------------------------- Probabilissimo. Le prime resistenze-chiave le abbiamo sfiorate oggi e le ritesteremo in settimana, pronti magari ad oltrepassarle facendo ancora un po' di casino fino al 31 marzo. Poi cercheranno di fissare nuovi punti di equilibrio da cui ripartire. Direi che pure agli svizzeri interessa un cambio debole. E' vero, ha guadagnato qualcosa vs euro, ma lì era in overshooting e un rientro era legittimo. Ma se guardiamo UsdChf, malgrado lo sbraitare della Banca Centrale e l'unwind dello Yen, ha recuperato pochissimo.


  By: corcas on Lunedì 05 Marzo 2007 11:39

Visti i dati di stanotte mi trovi più che d'accordo


  By: hobi on Lunedì 05 Marzo 2007 11:22

La mia è solo un'idea macro: non ho la + pallida idea di quale potrà essere il pot dello yen. Ma ritengo che i consumi in Giappone non abbiano ancora svoltato e quindi solo l'export puo scongiurare la deflazione. E quindi i carry trade riprenderanno perchè l'interesse generale è per uno yen debole. Hobi


  By: corcas on Lunedì 05 Marzo 2007 11:14

Hobi, tocca capire quando si fermerà....è tutto lì! :-) I livelli attuali cominciano a non essere malaccio


  By: hobi on Lunedì 05 Marzo 2007 11:10

In occasione del sell off del maggio scorso la massa monetaria dello yen si contrasse del 20% circa. Era il sistema bancario giapponese che, inondato dalla liquidità riveniente dal rimborso dei prestiti, la portava in banca centrale. Ora dovrebbe avvenire lo stesso. Quando la banca del Giappone ricomincerà a pompare liquidità su richiesta del sistema lo yen probabilmente ricomincerà ad indebolirsi ed una bella scommessa contro ci sta tutta( anche perchè a termine vale il 4,75% in + contro dollaro). Hobi


  By: corcas on Lunedì 05 Marzo 2007 09:56

Cavolo, è un'ecatombe oggi. Il vero lunedì nero! Lo yen ha fatto banzai e la vedo tanto tanto male per gli states e per noi quanto a equity. Target 38.700 su FIB come primo baluardo comunque!

l'"indice di borsa cinese" non esiste - gz  

  By: GZ on Lunedì 05 Marzo 2007 02:42

l'indice cinese a Shangai (ne esiste uno anche a Hong Kong e uno a NY ) cedendo del -10% lunedì sembra aver dato inizio a questa correzione del -5% circa di tutte le borse Questo è ridicolo se un pensa che l'"indice di borsa cinese" non esiste, è solo un casinò senza regole che in teoria capitalizza 1.4 mila miliardi di $, ma in realtà ha solo 160 miliardi di flottante che è trattato da pubblico o fondi e tutto il resto è in mano al partito comunista cinese (sono tutte società statali controllate, controllate dal partito) ----------------- ....Although the official market capitalization is $1.3-trillion, most of this amount is in shares that cannot legally be traded until 2008 or 2009 because of rules imposed when they were converted to A-shares, explained Arthur Kroeber, director of Dragonomics Research in Beijing. Only about $400-billion worth of shares can be legally traded now, he said, and of this amount, only about $160-billion are held by retail or institutional investors. This means that 60 per cent of tradable shares are controlled by state corporations, government agencies, the police, the army, or large private investors with dubious legal status. Despite the reforms of recent years, the Chinese market is still riddled with manipulation and insider trading, and it will take at least another 10 years before it reaches any level of maturity, Mr. Kroeber predicted. “The market prices aren't set by any transparent process,” he said. “The prices of the stocks are unrelated to their value. Nobody really knows who owns the stocks. This is basically the same old casino that it always was.” Mr. Li recalls that only two or three years ago, economists were warning Chinese investors to stay away from the stock market because it resembled a casino. Today, nobody seems to listen. “Now look at these old men and women, struggling to pour into the market,” he said, nodding at the people around him in the cramped trading hall. “Did they forget all those warnings? The stock market is like a lion that eats meat, and I believe that most of the newcomers and old people will become meat.”

Parmalat in Cina - gz  

  By: GZ on Giovedì 08 Febbraio 2007 21:04

Per non dare l'impressione di avere ora un punto di vista preconcetto del tipo vedi tutto positivo o tutto negativo segnalo qui il pezzo di due giorni fa di ^Nicholas Vardy#^ che è uno che suggerisce sempre titoli da comprare sul ^Collasso Imminente delle Banche Cinesi#^ Vardy nota che solo due anni fa i crediti fatti dalle banche cinesi alle imprese locali erano 3.700 miliardi di dollari, 2 volte il PIL ! (oggi dopo due anni di crescita accellerata ovviamente saranno molti di più) I crediti incagliati dovrebbero essere almeno 900 miliardi di dollari (secondo uno studio di Ernst & Young del 2005 che è stato soppresso subito dal governo cinese, con ^la società di contabilità lo ritrattò scusandosi del "rapporto erroneo"#^). Probabilmente adesso saranno 1.000 miliardi Questi sono numeri assurdi, vuole dire che le banche cinesi che sono tuttora statali e al cui vertice siedono funzionari del partito prestano qualunque somma a qualunque azienda abbia legami con il governo locale o regionale o nazionale e non si sognano di farli pagare e nemmeno di farsi pagare gli interessi Se in Italia che ha un PIL uguale circa a quello della Cina le nostre banche facessero prestiti per 3.000 o 4.000 miliardi come in Cina la nostra economia crescerebbe più in fretta di quella cinese. Per qualche anno, fino a quando si riuscisse a tenere nascosti i numeri dei crediti incagliati e se potessimo manipolare i tassi di interesse, il cambio e le statistiche economiche dandola a bere alla comunità internazionale Diciamo che la Cina oltre ad avere milioni di persone estremamente intelligenti che lavorano duro ha però anche una struttura finanziari eredita dal feudalesimo+comunismo che è indentica a quella di Parmalat. Cioè Parmalat è una società che dal niente ha avuto una crescita incredibile in dieci anni ed era piena di gente che lavorava bene e i prodotti erano apprezzati. Ma da 20 milioni era arrivata a 8 miliardi di fatturato perchè aveva ricevuto prestiti su prestiti che non restituiva mai, ne prendeva sempre di nuovi e pagavi gli interessi di quelli vecchi con quelli nuovi raccontando a tutti che era in utile mentre le perdite si accumulavano ----------------------- ..At the end of 2004, bank debt in China stood at $3.7 trillion -- about twice the size of its GDP. That's the highest proportion of any economy in the world. And that debt is lent almost entirely by state-owned banks -- and over half of it by the Big Four. Today, Chinese state-owned enterprises [SOEs] owe banks over $2 trillion -- about the size of the entire Chinese economy. And the amount of outstanding loans is growing by $500 billion each year. None of this will shock any student of Communist economies. This is just the way financial institutions in "soft budget constraint" socialist economies work. That is the insight of Communist Eastern Europe's only Nobel Prize caliber economist (and now Harvard professor), the Hungarian Janos Kornai. In socialist economies, cheap loans combined keep inefficient state-owned enterprise afloat. They also mean that a lot of goods are produced that shouldn't be produced in the first place. Throw in China's cheap labor and you see why the Chinese are selling Honda knock-off motorcycles at the price of their weight in scrap metal in Vietnam. This may lead to impressive rates of "top-line" economic growth in the medium term. But it also leads to the kind of massive misallocation of resources that eventually brought the Soviet Empire to its knees. This makes the coming collapse of Chinese banks inevitable. And it won't be the first time it will have happened. In the Asian crisis of 1997, two Guandong banks went belly up -- exposing the massive non-performing loans given to the Chinese red chips floated in Hong Kong. Of course, investment bankers flogging shares of China's state-owned banks will tell you "this time it's different." But ply them with drinks at a Hong Kong hotel bar and they'll admit that much of the improvement in the balance sheets of China's banks comes from re-classifying hundreds of billions' worth of risky loans from "non-performing" to "special mention" -- and not because of any genuine change in lending practices. Indeed, when Ernst & Young suggested in 2005 that banks' bad debts in China might amount to as much as $911 billion, the Chinese government quickly suppressed the report. That should be no surprise. Repressing the truth is what Communist governments are best at. But the next time you hear about China's $1 trillion of foreign reserves, remember that this world record stash is barely enough to pay off its bad banking debts. And with cheap loans financing a big chunk of China's 10%+ annual economic expansion, bad debts may approach $2 trillion before the bubble bursts. ..